Thanks for commenting. I think that Epicurean hedonism does indeed fall under the umbrella of moral realism. While the exact form that virtuous behavior will take varies from place to place, Epicurus does not think that the virtues are *purely* conventional. This is most well-documented in the case of justice. He notes that laws will vary from place to place (there is no one universally right number for speed limits, tax rates, or prison sentences, for instance), but does think that we can objectively judge whether a given law is conducive to "advantage" (i.e. pleasure, utility, or happiness). If it is not, then that law is not just (Principal Doctrines 36-37).
So, while Epicurus shows good awareness that many instances of "moral" behavior are in fact culturally-dependent, he thinks those different cultural variations all developed (and should continue to develop) in order to promote the true, objective good of human pleasure. I think the simplest way to read today's text (PD 5) is to simply treat "living justly" as "following the law"--I think here his primary subject is the relation of the individual to his particular society, whatever their exact laws and norms may be--but he will have more to say on how we can evaluate justice on the societal level when we get to PD 36-38.
I didn't mean to imply that the Epicureans aren't in the moral realism camp. They see pleasure as an objective moral good and pain as an objective moral bad. But those things aren't virtue. I think Epicurus sees virtue as socially constructed. I think Principle Doctrine 33 is quite clear about this:
Absolute justice does not exist. There are only mutual agreements among men, made at various times and places, not to inflict nor allow harm.
Thanks for clarifying. I basically agree with you, though I think the case of justice is still a nuanced one that requires careful discussion, depending on the perspective under consideration.
You are right that PD 33 is quite clear that justice exists only for the purpose of hedonic benefit. But when he says things such as "But if one establishes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in our dealings with one another, this no longer possesses the nature of justice" (PD 37), this seems to be suggesting that "justice" can be used as an objective indicator essentially synonymous with "conducive to mutual hedonic benefit." In this sense, the "nature of justice" is not purely socially constructed, although the details of legal form will vary from society to society.
I don't think "useful" in PD 37 is a matter of opinion, exactly. I think τὸ συμφέρον is a quite general concept: it could also be translated as "the useful" or "advantage." It's the same word in PD 31, which has perhaps a slightly more generalizing tone: "The justice of nature is a covenant of [shared] advantage." I would grant that "useful" is inherently subjective in terms of *whom* is being benefited, but don't think Epicurus would agree that it is subjective *whether* someone is being benefited. I think he would say, for instance, that the nearly universal laws against murder or theft, are just laws because they protect against real, objective harm, and that this is a matter for empirical calculation, not one of opinion.
This is even clearer in a passage from Porphyry summarizing Hermarchus (Epicurus' immediate successor) as saying:
"Those who, considering what has been framed in law, say that the good and just derives from the individual beliefs of each person, are deeply foolish. For this case can be no different than other matters of identifying what is advantageous, as we do in matters of health or countless other subjects." (Of Abstinence 1.12)
So, I would paraphrase the core of PD 37 as saying "If a law does not contribute to the advantage of society, then that law is not just." In Epicureanism, "advantage" must refer to the promotion of pleasure or reduction of pain, so for our current purposes we could further paraphrase the maxim as "If a law does not increase pleasure, then it is not just." This is perhaps a different emphasis than most "defenders of justice" would favor, but I think it is ultimately the claim of a moral realist.
Anyways, I'm not sure we disagree about anything important! I just wanted to be pedantically clear to passing readers that Epicurus is not a pure cultural relativist and does assert that we have objective criteria for judging the usefulness of a society's laws and customs.
I looked up Of Abstinence 1.12 to read it in context. I think what Porphyry says here supports my reading. The Epicureans think that pleasure and pain form objective moral values. So, the calculation of advantage using pleasure and pain is objective. So, what is being rejected is:
"So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men respecting those who establish the laws, are full of a certain most profound stupidity. "
And the basis of this statement is that not everything is a matter of opinion and that which is beyond opinion is pleasure and pain.
Interesting that you should point out that the virtues are socially constructed. Just this morning https://figsinwintertime.substack.com/p/meta-ethics-star-trek-and-samurai came out claiming that they're not - that virtue ethics are a form of moral realism.
Thanks for commenting. I think that Epicurean hedonism does indeed fall under the umbrella of moral realism. While the exact form that virtuous behavior will take varies from place to place, Epicurus does not think that the virtues are *purely* conventional. This is most well-documented in the case of justice. He notes that laws will vary from place to place (there is no one universally right number for speed limits, tax rates, or prison sentences, for instance), but does think that we can objectively judge whether a given law is conducive to "advantage" (i.e. pleasure, utility, or happiness). If it is not, then that law is not just (Principal Doctrines 36-37).
So, while Epicurus shows good awareness that many instances of "moral" behavior are in fact culturally-dependent, he thinks those different cultural variations all developed (and should continue to develop) in order to promote the true, objective good of human pleasure. I think the simplest way to read today's text (PD 5) is to simply treat "living justly" as "following the law"--I think here his primary subject is the relation of the individual to his particular society, whatever their exact laws and norms may be--but he will have more to say on how we can evaluate justice on the societal level when we get to PD 36-38.
More to come on that! I did touch on these themes in my recent article on political engagement (https://www.untroubled.blog/p/dont-worry-about-politics).
I didn't mean to imply that the Epicureans aren't in the moral realism camp. They see pleasure as an objective moral good and pain as an objective moral bad. But those things aren't virtue. I think Epicurus sees virtue as socially constructed. I think Principle Doctrine 33 is quite clear about this:
Absolute justice does not exist. There are only mutual agreements among men, made at various times and places, not to inflict nor allow harm.
Thanks for clarifying. I basically agree with you, though I think the case of justice is still a nuanced one that requires careful discussion, depending on the perspective under consideration.
You are right that PD 33 is quite clear that justice exists only for the purpose of hedonic benefit. But when he says things such as "But if one establishes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in our dealings with one another, this no longer possesses the nature of justice" (PD 37), this seems to be suggesting that "justice" can be used as an objective indicator essentially synonymous with "conducive to mutual hedonic benefit." In this sense, the "nature of justice" is not purely socially constructed, although the details of legal form will vary from society to society.
But look where the criterion of "useful" is in PD 37: it's a matter of opinion. That's not moral realism.
I don't think "useful" in PD 37 is a matter of opinion, exactly. I think τὸ συμφέρον is a quite general concept: it could also be translated as "the useful" or "advantage." It's the same word in PD 31, which has perhaps a slightly more generalizing tone: "The justice of nature is a covenant of [shared] advantage." I would grant that "useful" is inherently subjective in terms of *whom* is being benefited, but don't think Epicurus would agree that it is subjective *whether* someone is being benefited. I think he would say, for instance, that the nearly universal laws against murder or theft, are just laws because they protect against real, objective harm, and that this is a matter for empirical calculation, not one of opinion.
This is even clearer in a passage from Porphyry summarizing Hermarchus (Epicurus' immediate successor) as saying:
"Those who, considering what has been framed in law, say that the good and just derives from the individual beliefs of each person, are deeply foolish. For this case can be no different than other matters of identifying what is advantageous, as we do in matters of health or countless other subjects." (Of Abstinence 1.12)
So, I would paraphrase the core of PD 37 as saying "If a law does not contribute to the advantage of society, then that law is not just." In Epicureanism, "advantage" must refer to the promotion of pleasure or reduction of pain, so for our current purposes we could further paraphrase the maxim as "If a law does not increase pleasure, then it is not just." This is perhaps a different emphasis than most "defenders of justice" would favor, but I think it is ultimately the claim of a moral realist.
Anyways, I'm not sure we disagree about anything important! I just wanted to be pedantically clear to passing readers that Epicurus is not a pure cultural relativist and does assert that we have objective criteria for judging the usefulness of a society's laws and customs.
I looked up Of Abstinence 1.12 to read it in context. I think what Porphyry says here supports my reading. The Epicureans think that pleasure and pain form objective moral values. So, the calculation of advantage using pleasure and pain is objective. So, what is being rejected is:
"So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men respecting those who establish the laws, are full of a certain most profound stupidity. "
And the basis of this statement is that not everything is a matter of opinion and that which is beyond opinion is pleasure and pain.