Scholar Spotlight: Tim O’Keefe
Don't take it from me: good work on Epicurean ethics
Diogenes Laertius tells us that the writings of Epicurus numbered over three hundred volumes. Unfortunately, most of those writings have been lost: we have three short letters, the Principal Doctrines, a later collection of aphorisms known as the Vatican Sayings, and assorted fragments and testimonials. Due to the fragmentary nature of our primary sources, the work of scholars who can reconstruct our scattered evidence to form more coherent and comprehensive accounts of Epicurean views takes on increasing importance. One contemporary scholar who has done a great deal of work in this vein is Tim O’Keefe of Georgia State University.
Today, I’d like to give you a brief tour of five of his Epicurean papers that are both publicly available and distinctly helpful. There is a lot of scholarly work that is far more interesting to specialists than to general readers, but O’Keefe is somewhat exceptional, I feel, in choosing subjects that are of actual ethical importance rather than mere narrow topics of historical or textual dispute. In particular, several of his papers serve as sympathetic synthesizing efforts that help make the Epicurean perspective on a given issue clear, rather than assuming specialist knowledge and then focusing on some narrow claim that is of minimal interest to anyone other than specialists (not that he won’t take on other scholars when he thinks they are misinterpreting the ancient texts). Finally, O’Keefe possesses one more quality rare in published academic writing—humor. I’ll highlight a few examples below as we peruse some of his greatest Epicurean hits.
Paper #1: Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic? (2001)
Available on Phil Archive
Epicurus is generally classed as both a psychological and ethical egoist—he believes that we both necessarily act in our own self-interest and that it is always right for us to do so. However, he also is famous for his praise of friendship, which may seem at first glance to be a preeminently other-regarding activity. Isn’t the point of sincere friendship that one does care about the interests of others? This seeming incompatibility has on the one hand led a lot of unsympathetic listeners to dismiss or downplay Epicurus’ enthusiasm for friendship, while on the other leading some scholars who are highly aware of Epicurus’ documented enthusiasm for friendship to an awkward position of asserting that Epicurus is not a consistent egoist, whatever he says to the contrary.
In this paper, O’Keefe responds to those scholars, addressing nearly all of Epicurus’ texts on friendship (as well as ancient testimonials as to the Epicurean position, most notably Cicero in On Moral Ends) in order to construct a framework for Epicurean friendship that is both consistently egoistic and sincerely committed to friendship. The short version of this framework, which I find convincing, is that Epicurus has a two-level system, analogous to what is sometimes called “rule-utilitarianism” as opposed to “act-utilitarianism” in that non-egoistic system. In this understanding, while Epicurus views the ultimate goal of friendship to be our own self-interest (through material assistance, reduction of fear, and potentially—though this is disputed to some degree by O’Keefe—through the direct pleasure we receive from conversation and so on), we nonetheless will often weigh the interests of our friends equally to our own in any given situation.
I believe O’Keefe is correct in outlining Epicurus’ position like this:
Friendship is extremely valuable for our sense of security.
Reliable friendship requires that you act in a trustworthy way towards your friends, looking out for their interests equally with your own.
Therefore, the best way to secure your own long-term self-interest is to practice sincere friendship, even if that means prioritizing your friend’s interests over your own in a given situation.
Even some scholars get this wrong, but O’Keefe doesn’t—Epicurus is definitely an egoist, but he is still a better friend than most putative altruists.
Paper #2: The Epicureans on happiness, wealth, and the deviant craft of property management (2016)
Draft available on Phil Archive
Here, O’Keefe is primarily discussing Philodemus’ On Property Management. Philodemus was a later Epicurean, active around the Bay of Naples in the first century BCE (Cicero mentions him as a prominent Epicurean of the time). We have recovered fragments from several otherwise unknown philosophical treatises by Philodemus from the so-called Villa of the Papyri, which was buried by the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE. Many of these works have been published in some form (this one in translation by Voula Tsouna in 2012), but all are far from complete and require a great deal of painstaking reconstruction to understand. For most casual readers, therefore, the original texts of Philodemus are not easy or inviting reading.
That’s where papers like this are useful: here, O’Keefe extracts some of Philodemus’ core points, summarizes the philosophical precursors with whom he is arguing (Plato, Xenophon, and Theophrastus), and sets his argument in its larger Epicurean context. In short, Philodemus believes that wisdom will exclude maximizing one’s financial acumen: attempting to make as much money as possible will induce stress and require an investment of time and attention that is incompatible with Epicurean tranquility. The wise man will not be foolhardy with his money, but will often settle for “good enough” rather than getting overly invested in financial optimization. Sound advice.
From around this point on in his career, O’Keefe also lets his personal humor peer through in his writings. In his summary, pleasurable activities with bad long-term consequences include “shooting up heroin or punching out people who annoy you,” while Plato’s character Gorgias argues that crafts are morally neutral, such that “boxers can use their skill either to defend the innocent or to pummel small children for fun” without any implication for their aptitude as boxers. I always find it preferable when scholars don’t force themselves to be boring in their examples.
Paper #3: Epicurean Advice for the Modern Consumer, 2020
Draft available on Phil Archive
In this paper, O’Keefe draws on a variety of Epicurean sources to summarize the school’s views on money, consumption, and happiness, then compares their advice with that of modern empirical psychology. On the surface, this is simple—he isn’t making any particularly tenuous, controversial, or groundbreaking new interpretation of our source texts. But it is something that is all too rarely done in formal academic writing: evaluating the actual content of that ancient advice and seeing how it holds up for modern use. (This is also the one where he talks about Tom Yum soup and angry, kicking students wearing Doc Martens.)
So what is the advice? Understand what is actually needed to satisfy our necessary desires. Recognize which unnecessary desires should be reined in, rather than encouraged. Put yourself in an environment that encourages good habits, i.e. by associating with philosophically like-minded companions. Consider what truly enhances your security—friends do, but excessive wealth doesn’t.
As O’Keefe summarizes, these positions are generally supported by modern empirical research on happiness: materialism is negatively correlated with well-being, while gratitude is positively correlated with it. Increased wealth doesn’t seem to lead clearly to increased happiness at higher income levels. Our desires can be negatively impacted by our environment—such as through exposure to advertising and social media—but can also be positively modified through conscious reflection, as shown through studies on the effectiveness of cognitive-behavior therapy.
Epicurean ethical advice should not be confined to textbooks on the history of philosophy. It was good advice in 300 BCE and it’s good advice now.
Paper #4: The Normativity of Nature in Epicurean Ethics and Politics, 2021
Draft available on Phil Archive
Epicurus often makes appeals to “nature”—we should pursue natural desires rather than groundless ones, look to “uncorrupted” infants for a true picture of natural human desires, and always keep in mind the “natural good” aimed at in the acquisition of wealth and the definition of justice. Many a philosophy class, however, has found such arguments vexing rather than straightforwardly convincing: does being “natural” mean that something is ethically preferable?
Here, O’Keefe goes through essentially all of the different Epicurean appeals to nature to determine what exactly is meant by “natural” in each case and how that naturalness contributes to Epicurus’ ethical arguments. This closer analysis reveals a strategy that is usually best described as pragmatic, rather than dismissed as fallacious. For instance, “natural” desires for food or sex are biologically determined and probably can’t be eliminated. To argue for their elimination would be foolish, so instead we should try to manage those desires prudently. In contrast, unnatural desires (which are culturally learned, rather than innate) are more likely candidates for elimination: the desires to be portrayed in public statues or to have a billion dollars, for instance, are clearly not innate, and so it seems plausible to remove those desires through the cognitive training of philosophy.
I think a lot of normal people automatically incline towards the idea that what is natural is good (consider the successful marketing of “natural sweeteners” or “natural remedies,” for instance). Epicurus can be read simply and easily from this unreflective normie perspective: of course following our nature will generally work out better. O’Keefe’s work, however, demonstrates that Epicurus’ appeals to nature are not merely sloppy thinking or naïve sloganeering, but do in fact constitute a coherent basis for prudent ethical judgment.
Paper #5: Achieving Tranquility: Epicurus on Living without Fear, 2025
Draft available on Phil Archive
O’Keefe’s latest piece on Epicurean ethics is another work of helpful synthesis. While many correctly note that Epicurean “hedonism” is primarily about the reduction of pain, that bald summary can overlook the next layer of analysis: Epicurus believes that avoiding bodily pain is pretty simple, and that therefore most of our therapeutic attention should go to avoiding mental pain. The largest component of mental pain is fear. (Epicurus does also discuss other disturbing emotions such as regret and envy.)
In this paper, O’Keefe provides a tour of the types of fear identified by the Epicureans, and how they propose to ameliorate each one. Some fears are founded on false beliefs: hence the Epicurean focus on the use of science for dispelling superstition about the gods and about death. Correcting those false beliefs spares us from unnecessary fear. As O’Keefe helpfully points out, however, other fears do have a foundation in real concerns. If we think we won’t have enough food to eat or that we won’t have a safe shelter to sleep in tomorrow, it is normal and healthy that we would fear those outcomes. To reduce and manage those fears, we want to develop our practical wisdom (another translation for phronesis, also rendered as “prudence”) so that we can skillfully use our available tools to secure what we truly need. For instance, frugal living and dependable friends will greatly enhance our sense of security, while an extravagant lifestyle and celebrity probably won’t.
All in all, O’Keefe is probably my favorite scholar working on Epicurean ethics today. In the future, I’ll highlight other researchers who are making valuable contributions to the field as well, but few have O’Keefe’s track record of consistently covering topics that are truly important, accurately interpreting the Epicurean position, and rendering it into a form that is both readable and applicable to modern life. If you like the articles listed here, I encourage you to seek out more of his work, particularly his 2010 book Epicureanism, which is one of the best one-volume overviews of the philosophy if you’d like to go beyond ethics and learn more about Epicurean physics, anthropology, epistemology, and more.