How Will a Wise Man Live?

Translation Tuesday: Diogenes Laertius on Epicurean Ethics, Part 1

Tranquil marriages are good. Detail from An Out-of-Doors Study, John Singer Sargent.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, X.117–119

Regarding the principles of life and how it is necessary for us to choose things on the one hand and avoid things on the other, [Epicurus] writes in this way. But first let us go through the characteristics of the wise man that seem true to him and to his followers.

[It seems to the Epicureans that] men bring us harm because of hatred, envy, or contempt, which the wise man overcomes through reasoned calculation. But once he has become wise he no longer admits any disposition contrary to wisdom nor willingly feigns any. He will be affected more by feelings, but this will not hinder him from wisdom. One can become wise neither from every bodily condition nor in every nation.

Even if he is tortured, the wise man will be happy. Only the wise man will have gratitude and will speak well of his friends, equally with them being present or absent. When he is tortured, however, he will both moan and wail.

The wise man will not have intercourse with a woman for whom the laws forbid it, as says Diogenes [of Tarsus] in his summary of Epicurus’ ethical teachings. Nor will he punish his servants, but will show mercy and forgive those who are of good character. It does not seem to them that the wise man will be overcome by passionate desire. Nor will he care about his burial. Neither do they think that Eros is sent by the gods, as Diogenes says in his twelfth book, nor will he make elegant speeches in public. They say that sex never helps anyone, and that one must be content if it does no harm. The wise man will also both marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems, and in On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life.

He will be conscious of shame before certain people and will not act foolishly in drunkenness, says Epicurus in the Symposium. Nor will he meddle in politics, as he says in the first book of On Lives. Nor will he be a tyrant or a Cynic, as he writes in the second book of On Lives. Nor will he beg.

Commentary

Diogenes Laertius (c. 230 AD) is our main source for Epicurus (died 270 BC), since it is within his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers that are preserved our most significant and extended texts from Epicurus himself (the letters to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus, as well as the Principal Doctrines). Along with a biography of Epicurus and a discussion of the various insults and accusations the different philosophical schools liked to throw his way, Diogenes also offers a useful compendium of Epicurus’ ethical advice. I’ll be covering this section in three installments of Tuesday Translations, alternating with my ongoing coverage of the Principal Doctrines.

As a rational and orderly summary, Diogenes’ account makes no sense. It is arranged seemingly at random, with occasionally dubious understanding. But Diogenes Laertius clearly had access to more Epicurean texts than us, and so his report conveys a lot of useful information that we otherwise would not have. Some of these tidbits are fairly self-explanatory, but some are worth pausing on briefly, either to offer further elucidation or simply to highlight sometimes overlooked elements. I will therefore proceed through the whole of today’s section with some hopefully useful notes as we go.

Regarding the principles of life and how it is necessary for us to choose things on the one hand and avoid things on the other, [Epicurus] writes in this way. But first let us go through the characteristics of the wise man that seem true to him and to his followers.

[It seems to the Epicureans that] men bring us harm because of hatred, envy, or contempt, which the wise man overcomes through reasoned calculation. But once he has become wise he no longer admits any disposition contrary to wisdom nor willingly feigns any.

We begin the description of the wise man by describing how he deals with external sources of harm: through reasoned calculation (logismo), a process also discussed in Principal Doctrine 16. Then we turn inwards, from dealing with the hatred and envy of others to handling one’s own emotional dispositions. This whole excerpt is highly disjointed, but I assume at least some rough thematic continuity here, such that “disposition contrary to wisdom” includes emotions similar to those just mentioned (hatred, envy, and contempt). As I interpret it, such feelings are themselves sources of harm and contrary to wisdom. Many people will attempt to justify these emotions. Some (I hear this from some Stoics) will argue for feigning negative emotions if we judge that the behaviors are beneficial. Epicurus basically says no: hatred and envy are never choiceworthy, and the wise man will not pretend to have such emotions either. Perhaps he thinks that such pretending would result in generating at least some level of psychological disturbance; perhaps he thinks the benefits of such behavior are overrated.

He will be affected more by feelings, but this will not hinder him from wisdom.

Next, however, is the intriguing note that the wise man will be “more affected by feelings” than other men. Some think that “feelings” is being used here in a relatively narrow and technical way, suggesting something like “the wise man is very attuned to evaluating his own pleasure and pain, and so perceives these things more clearly.” Some think it is a more general statement refuting the idea (which some might jump to prematurely from the previous sentence) that the wise Epicurean will be an unfeeling block of stone. (If you ever run into this contention, say in the Substack of a prominent modern Stoic, know that it is simply false, and based on erroneous reporting of the evidence and instinctive opposition.) In this case, “affected more” might refer to the way the Epicurean wise man would relish pleasurable emotions such as those associated with security, comfort, or friendship, even while he reduces the salience of negative emotions in his life. Both positions are authentic Epicurean ones and I couldn’t rule out either as an interpretation of this sentence.

One can become wise neither from every bodily condition nor in every nation.

“Nation” is enthos, which can also mean race or class. The translators and commentors are divided; I can’t really say with certainty which one Epicurus had in mind, nor exactly what he was thinking with “bodily condition.” Overall, I suspect we should probably be wary of interpreting this as some broad-brush prejudice: the Epicureans were famously the most inviting school for the lower classes, scorning elitist education and its traditional paideia while welcoming foreigners, women, and slaves to the ranks of philosophy. Instead, I would guess that this is a statement of missionary realism: many people are resistant to philosophy due to some aspect or other of their nature, and so we have to calmly accept that some are unlikely to be convinced by Epicurean arguments.

Even if he is tortured, the wise man will be happy. Only the wise man will have gratitude and will speak well of his friends, equally with them being present or absent. When he is tortured, however, he will both moan and wail.

If you read Cicero’s On Moral Ends, he misreports this in a very petty way, claiming that the Epicurean wise man will feel delight and pleasure on the rack. That isn’t what he says. Epicurus readily admits that a person being tortured will “moan and wail.” What he does maintain is that the most perfectly wise individual will nonetheless be “happy” (eudaimon). Being happy in such circumstances is not an easily obtainable achievement, but an asymptotic, aspirational one: to grow in wisdom is to increasingly build up your reserves of pleasure and perspective so that increasingly large discomforts can be counterbalanced and overcome.

A highly unwise person will be easily disturbed from happiness by a minor financial setback or minor physical injury. A comparatively wiser person will be able to maintain happiness even under significant losses or illness. A perfectly wise person will be able to maintain happiness under even the worst conditions. Fortunately (as Epicurus’ overall teachings make clear), there is plenty of room for rational planning to ensure that almost no one has to face those worst conditions.

The wise man will not have intercourse with a woman for whom the laws forbid it, as says Diogenes [of Tarsus] in his summary of Epicurus’ ethical teachings. Nor will he punish his servants, but will show mercy and forgive those who are of good character. It does not seem to them that the wise man will be overcome by passionate desire. Nor will he care about his burial. Neither do they think that Eros is sent by the gods, as Diogenes says in his [twelfth] book, nor will he make elegant speeches in public. They say that sex never helps anyone, and that one must be content if it does no harm. The wise man will also both marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems, and in On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life.

This passage seemingly sets out a number of both “anti-love” and “pro-love” positions, in common oversimplifying summaries. In truth, there is no contradiction here. Sex that is against the law is bad. Obsessive erotic passion is also bad. What I translate as “overcome by passionate desire” is the verb eramai (ἔραμαι, the verbal form of eros). Many translators render this as “fall in love,” but this is potentially misleading in English. Phileo (φιλέω, the verbal form of philia, commonly rendered “friendship”) is a verb that, applied to a man’s wife, for example, we would render as “love” in English—and that kind of stable affection is encouraged by Epicureans. This can be inferred from their clear pro-marriage position, and is explicit in Lucretius.

Sex in itself should not be mistaken as a significant target of our actions (the “one must be content if it does no harm” line seems to be based on a letter of Metrodorus which we know from other sources—it is good to remember that these assorted positions are not always drawn from Epicurus himself, but from “the Epicureans). Marriage, however, is approved of and encouraged. (Some early editors unjustifiably amended this to read “will not marry”—I believe this is still in the old Loeb edition, for instance—but that is not what the text says.)

I disentangle the Epicurean distinctions about good and bad love further in The Classification of the Desires.

He will be conscious of shame before certain people and will not act foolishly in drunkenness, says Epicurus in the Symposium.

This first clause is a confusing one, with three different translations proposed for kai diatrapesesthai tinas (καὶ διατραπήσεσθαί τινας):

1. Usener, followed by Arrighetti and Inwood and Gerson, think it means “some turn aside” from marriage, referring to the previous sentence. This doesn’t seem to add much to the already qualified assertion, however, nor does it seem to be the most common use of the verb.

2. Translators Strodach and Mensch opt for understanding “turn aside” as meaning to “avoid” or “avert” certain people. This is good Epicureanism (I understand Principal Doctrine 39 as recommending something similar), but also seems like a relatively less common use of the word. It also has a weaker tie with the rest of the sentence.

3. Bailey opts for a sense of “turn aside” equivalent to “turn aside in shame” or simply “feel shame.”

My impression is that Bailey is right in thinking this the most common use of the word in Greek at this period, and such a reading also fits most naturally with the rest of the sentence as advice appropriate to a book on symposia. To “feel shame” in this context should therefore be understood as something like “the wise man will be aware of appropriate behavior and will not act in a socially shameful way.”

Nor will he meddle in politics, as he says in the first book of On Lives. Nor will he be a tyrant or a Cynic, as he writes in the second book of On Lives. Nor will he beg.

Epicurus’ advice regarding political involvement is a natural extension of this egoistic prudence: engaging in politics is highly likely to incur pains and inconveniences for the individual in exchange for very dubious benefits. (For more, see my Don’t Worry About Politics.) Being a tyrant would represent one extreme of concern with other people, seeing one’s good as consisting in maximizing one’s control over others. Being a Cynic would represent the opposite extreme, ignoring all prudence and propriety and thinking that our social reception is completely irrelevant to our well-being. Begging is both a behavior of the Cynics specifically, and a generally shameful action in the eyes of society.

In reality, our social position does matter to some degree, and we should tailor our actions accordingly. Friendship is best, when possible. In general, maintaining a modicum of social approval is prudent. With certain individuals, strategic avoidance is often reasonable. But neither seeking control over others nor ignoring all of our community’s social standards is an efficient way to pursue a pleasant life.

So far, this advice all seems quite good to me. Next time, we’ll cover another ecletic selection of topics: injury, grief, statues, poetry, public philosophizing, friendship, and more. I wish we had the cited books, but until we pluck them out from the ashes of Herculaneum, we will milk Diogenes Laertius for everything he’s got!

Original Text

The textual disputes in this passage are pretty minor and inconsequential, and so I mostly adopt the text of Bailey without comment. My only variation is that I slightly prefer Hermann’s ληρήσειν (talk nonsense, act foolishly) in 119 rather than Bailey’s ἐπηρεάσειν (insult) as a correction of the MS τηρήσειν. No one really knows the exact word though.

[117] Περὶ δὲ τῶν βιωτικῶν καὶ ὅπως χρὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς αἱρεῖσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκφεύγειν, οὑτωσὶ γράφει. πρότερον δὲ διέλθωμεν ἅ τε αὐτῷ δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ.

Βλάβας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἢ διὰ μῖσος ἢ διὰ φθόνον ἢ διὰ καταφρόνησιν γίνεσθαι, ὧν τὸν σοφὸν λογισμῷ περιγίνiεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα. πάθεσι μᾶλλον συσχεθήσεσθαι <ὁ> οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐκ πάσης σώματος ἕξεως σοφὸν γενέσθαι ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει.

[118] κἂν στρεβλωθῇ δ᾽ ὁ σοφός, εἶναι αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα, μόνον τε χάριν ἕξειν τὸν σοφόν, καὶ ἐπὶ φίλοις καὶ παροῦσι καὶ ἀποῦσιν ὁμοίως διατε<λειν> εὐλογοῦντα. ὅτε μέντοι στρεβλοῦται, ἔνθα καὶ μύζει καὶ οἰμώζει.

γυναικί τ᾽ οὐ μιγήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ᾗ οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, ὥς φησι Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἐπιτομῇ τῶν Ἐπικούρου ἠθικῶν δογμάτων. οὐδὲ κολάσειν οἰκέτας, ἐλεήσειν μέντοι καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἕξειν τῶν σπουδαίων. ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὐ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς: οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν: οὐδὲ θεόπεμπτον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, ὡς Διογένης ἐν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ φησίν. οὐδὲ ῥητορεύσειν καλῶς. συνουσίν δέ, φασιν, ὤνησε μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε. [119] Καὶ μὴν καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φύσεως. κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν.

καὶ διατραπήσεσθαί τινας, οὐδὲ μὴν [ληρήσειν] ἐν μέθῃ φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ. οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι, ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ βίων: οὐδὲ τυραννεύσειν: οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ βίων: οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν.