"note that the dependence of justice on the existence of some kind of social contract does not mean that justice is entirely mutable or subjective: there is a “justice of nature.”
Hello Jack, I'm glad you wrote on this point and am somewhat critical of DeWitt's writing on this point, that Justice basically just means obedience to the written law of the country, curious of you agree.
Also curious if you agree that Epicurus recognized a "guilty conscience" as Torquatus seems mentions, or of this was just a minor point for them, perhaps because it was too closely tied to political "honor".
"Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquilizing influence upon the mind...but what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows?" (On Ends, 1.50-51)
Narrowly, within the context of PD 5, I think DeWitt was basically correct in his reading. I think the point of that maxim in regard to justice was to assert that living pleasantly involves following the law and that following the law will lead to a more pleasant life. That practical, egoistic perspective seems to be the clear emphasis of PD 17, 34, and 35. I've written a bit more on 5 and 17 already, and will discuss 34 and 35 next time out.
You are right, though, that Epicurus recognizes that laws can fail to be just (the topic of PD 37 and 38). (DeWitt does recognize and discuss this on page 296 of his book.) Where I hesitate to go quite as far as you and Cassius do in that discussion is as to the degree to which Epicurus endorses or mandates that an individual personally insist on changing or disobeying a law that he perceives as unjust. I think that idea is far more prominent today than it was in his day, and I believe the truth is that we have nothing from Epicurus asserting that an individual should be particularly insistent about political reform. My sense is that if an Epicurean were asked to evaluate a law, he would be happy to assess its objective justness, but that he would generally make the prudential calculation that personally protesting an unjust law would not be the best use of his time and energy, or the best means of maintaining safety and tranquility. I don't think we have any evidence of politically reformist behavior among Epicureans. Their overall position seems clearly to me to be that most people overrate the importance of politics for happiness; the most important things for the good life are attainable by essentially everyone, no matter the inevitable imperfections of their home city's constitution. I've given my full perspective on politics here:
I do think Epicurus recognized the negative hedonic impacts of a "guilty conscience," though perhaps in a less far-reaching sense than some (e.g. Christians). Being aware that one has violated the law (or a strong social norm) leads to fear of punishment or disapproval, which causes uncomfortable disturbance. To be undisturbed by such fear is the definition of being ataraktos, i.e. being in the pleasant state of untroubledness or ataraxia.
"note that the dependence of justice on the existence of some kind of social contract does not mean that justice is entirely mutable or subjective: there is a “justice of nature.”
Hello Jack, I'm glad you wrote on this point and am somewhat critical of DeWitt's writing on this point, that Justice basically just means obedience to the written law of the country, curious of you agree.
https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/5282-criticism-of-dewitt-s-interpretation-of-principal-doctrine-5/?postID=41281#post41281
Also curious if you agree that Epicurus recognized a "guilty conscience" as Torquatus seems mentions, or of this was just a minor point for them, perhaps because it was too closely tied to political "honor".
"Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquilizing influence upon the mind...but what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows?" (On Ends, 1.50-51)
Narrowly, within the context of PD 5, I think DeWitt was basically correct in his reading. I think the point of that maxim in regard to justice was to assert that living pleasantly involves following the law and that following the law will lead to a more pleasant life. That practical, egoistic perspective seems to be the clear emphasis of PD 17, 34, and 35. I've written a bit more on 5 and 17 already, and will discuss 34 and 35 next time out.
https://www.untroubled.blog/p/pd-5-and-17
You are right, though, that Epicurus recognizes that laws can fail to be just (the topic of PD 37 and 38). (DeWitt does recognize and discuss this on page 296 of his book.) Where I hesitate to go quite as far as you and Cassius do in that discussion is as to the degree to which Epicurus endorses or mandates that an individual personally insist on changing or disobeying a law that he perceives as unjust. I think that idea is far more prominent today than it was in his day, and I believe the truth is that we have nothing from Epicurus asserting that an individual should be particularly insistent about political reform. My sense is that if an Epicurean were asked to evaluate a law, he would be happy to assess its objective justness, but that he would generally make the prudential calculation that personally protesting an unjust law would not be the best use of his time and energy, or the best means of maintaining safety and tranquility. I don't think we have any evidence of politically reformist behavior among Epicureans. Their overall position seems clearly to me to be that most people overrate the importance of politics for happiness; the most important things for the good life are attainable by essentially everyone, no matter the inevitable imperfections of their home city's constitution. I've given my full perspective on politics here:
https://www.untroubled.blog/p/dont-worry-about-politics
I do think Epicurus recognized the negative hedonic impacts of a "guilty conscience," though perhaps in a less far-reaching sense than some (e.g. Christians). Being aware that one has violated the law (or a strong social norm) leads to fear of punishment or disapproval, which causes uncomfortable disturbance. To be undisturbed by such fear is the definition of being ataraktos, i.e. being in the pleasant state of untroubledness or ataraxia.