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William's avatar

Hey Jack, great article! Quick two questions on the topic of friendship, if you don't mind.

First, do you think Epicurus also recognized the importance of "good cheer/someone to hang out" as an essential feature of friendship, or is it just about confidence in the future for him?

Secondly, I assume you agree friendship is on the desires necessary for happiness, I was curious what else you think might be on the necessary for happiness list and how you define it. I wrote a post on Epicureanfriends.com if you're interested of my own list.

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/5207-desires-necessary-for-happiness/

Great article once again!

Jack Gedney's avatar

I'm glad you enjoyed the post!

I don't think Epicurus would have dismissed the direct pleasure of a friend's company, but it is certainly true that the extant texts emphasize confidence about the future far more. To some degree this is probably just because "pleasant company" is a pretty much universally acknowledged aspect of friendship that doesn't really need to be actively argued for--you don't need to convince people that spending time with friends is pleasant!

I do think he would say that some people overrate the value of "pleasant company" relative to "true trustworthiness," however. For instance, sometimes family members move geographically farther apart in adulthood and don't spend much time together socializing, but still function as a very reliable safety net for each other. In contrast, some people attend lots of social gatherings with generally pleasant acquaintances with whom they have only a weak bond (parties, sports leagues, clubs, classes, etc.). The latter may be pleasant, and *may* be a good way to meet potential strong friends, but as long as the relationships remain superficial, I think Epicurus would rank them as less valuable than a relationship of deep trust but more sporadic "hanging out."

I think the "desires necessary for happiness" category is a little mysterious. Friendship does seem like one of the best candidates for something Epicurus would have included. I like the list you wrote up, but have some hesitation in declaring all of those things to be independent *desires*. I'm not sure Epicurus would say that everyone has a desire for, say, justice or knowledge that is itself a separable item that "necessarily" needs to be fulfilled. For instance: some modicum of scientific knowledge is quite arguably necessary for the effective fulfillment of our desires and for freedom from illusory fears, but it doesn't seem to function universally as a "desire" in the same way that the named necessary desires (for food, water, shelter, etc.) do. Unlike, say, Platonists and Peripatetics, Epicurus often emphasizes the instrumental utility of science and seems to be intentionally reluctant to endorse the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself.

Your suggestion of "security" seems like a quite good one to me, though. And "confidence in our knowledge" is a very interesting proposal: Skeptics would question the claim, but I think it is quite arguable that people do have an intrinsic desire for certainty that will leave them unsettled and discontented if not fulfilled in a reasonably stable manner. I haven't formulated a full list for myself--given the absence of any additional textual mentions of the category, I wonder if Epicurus even conceived of it himself as a strictly listable one--but this seems like a good place to start!

William's avatar

Perhaps Epicurus would say that we have a necessary desire to be intelligent in how we go about life, which includes the virtues, knowing how the world actually works, even if the skeptics deny it, making proper choices on how to live pleasantly, etc.

That's at least my reading on why I consider them desires necessary for happiness.

Do you agree with my definition at least?

Jack Gedney's avatar

I think he would definitely say that practical wisdom ("intelligence in how we go about life"), virtuous behavior, and understanding how the world works are all necessary for happiness. But I'm not sure that those are all independent objects of desire.

People desire to eat. That is clearly a necessary desire. But I'm not sure whether all people desire abstractly to be prudent or to be scientifically knowledgeable. Those kinds of things might be more precisely defined as instrumentally useful to fulfill our other desires (for instance: prudence is valuable because it helps secure our bodily needs, scientific knowledge is valuable because it alleviates unwarranted religious superstition). I think Epicurus was intentionally cautious and parsimonious about multiplying independent desires: as I suggested above, I think he specifically did *not* want to endorse "the desire for knowledge" as an independent value, contrary to some other schools of thought, for example.

I don't think I disagree with you on any substantive questions about the importance of these things. I'm just not sure whether or not all these good things were what Epicurus had in mind when he wrote the phrase "*desires* necessary for happiness."

William's avatar

Understood, I get your points, I think we'll just agree to disagree, as one does. Obviously with it being mentioned in only one line it's speculative, but I suspect that's what Epicurus might have had in mind.

Still great post though!

Charles's avatar

Wonderful post. - One of the effects of people having smaller families, even by just one less child, is a dramatic reduction in the size of your kin network. And as many people will list their siblings or cousins as among their closest friends, this shrinnking pool of friend-candidates is on more reason for the "loneliness epidemic." This is not to say that just being a sibling or cousin gets you out of the hard work of building a true friendship.