Did Epicurus Emphasize the Reduction of Pain? Of Course!

Frank debate is a good way to the truth

A pleasurable life doesn’t need much. Claude Lorrain - Pastoral Landscape with a Mill.

A disagreement has arisen in the Epicurean corner of the internet over the last few weeks regarding how much emphasis Epicurus placed on the reduction and avoidance of pain. I think the answer is clearly “a lot!” Some Epicureans, however, seem to feel that in modern contexts, the most salient risk is overemphasizing pain reduction: we should remember, they point out, that Epicurus advocated for the appreciation of easily accessible pleasures, not maximum ascetism.

Personally, I am not convinced about the merits of downplaying pain reduction’s place in Epicurean hedonic theory. While it is technically possible to overstate this emphasis, I think it is both extremely central to historical Epicureanism and essential to the philosophy’s therapeutic effectiveness to keep the focus on reducing and avoiding pain, broadly considered.

The disputed territory

I tiptoed into the debate with a passing phrase in my recent article reviewing the scholarly work of Tim O’Keefe, in which I wrote this:

While many correctly note that Epicurean “hedonism” is primarily about the reduction of pain, that bald summary can overlook the next layer of analysis: Epicurus believes that avoiding bodily pain is pretty simple, and that therefore most of our therapeutic attention should go to avoiding mental pain. The largest component of mental pain is fear.

A few commentors questioned this passing assertion, and a few days later a much more extended argument in favor of deemphasizing pain reduction came from Cassius over at Epicurean Friends. His thesis:

The claim that Epicurean philosophy is “primarily about the absence of pain” — that the Epicurean goal is a passive, featureless neutral state free from disturbance — is one of the most consequential misreadings in the history of philosophy.

Now, it should immediately be recognized that there are two different versions of the disparaged position here, which Cassius switches back and forth between in his essay. The first is the claim that Epicurean philosophy is “primarily about the absence of pain.” This is roughly what I believe, although even this more moderate framing is a little stronger than what I myself wrote:

Epicurean “hedonism” is primarily about the reduction of pain

There are other topics than pain reduction in the whole philosophy, and “reduction” is more precise than “absence”—the overall emphasis is on what can be done, not just an all-or-nothing insistence on achieving complete absence of pain. Overall, though, I think all variations of the “primarily” claim are worth considering and not dismissing out of hand.

The second iteration of the target position is the more dramatic claim that “the Epicurean goal is a passive, featureless neutral state free from disturbance.” I agree that this would be inaccurate. Cassius’ arguments against that position are correct. This concession, however, still leaves a significant gap in our choice of emphasis: Cassius seems to imply that mentions of pain avoidance are relatively minor and isolated elements of the philosophy, while I think the preeminent importance of pain reduction is the core thesis of Epicurean hedonism.

So, to clarify my position: I am not arguing that positive pleasures don’t exist or shouldn’t be enjoyed. “Primarily about the reduction of pain” does not mean “exclusively about the reduction of pain.” Nor would I endorse “The goal of life is absence of pain” as a good all-encompassing summary of Epicureanism. What I do believe Epicurus would agree with is that most of our therapeutic attention should go to avoiding mental pain.

The basic evidence for my position

Two texts are particularly foundational to my interpretation, Principal Doctrine 3 and the Letter to Menoeceus. In my own translation:

The greatest magnitude of pleasure possible is the removal of all suffering. And if our present state is pleasurable, then we are not experiencing pain, nor distress, nor both together. (PD 3)

Keeping these facts in unwavering focus allows us to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the serenity of the soul, for to secure these is the object of a blessed life. Everything we do is for this purpose: the avoidance of pain in our body and fear in our mind.

When we achieve this state, the storm inside of us goes quiet: when pain is removed, no creature feels compelled to travel on in quest of something missing, searching for something else to complete the good of its body and soul. For it is when we feel pain from the absence of pleasure that we require pleasure; when all our pain has been relieved, we need no further pleasure. This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life.

… When we say therefore that pleasure is the goal of life, we do not mean the pleasures of sensualists or those that depend on acts of enjoyment, as some maintain in ignorance, or because they disagree with us or willfully misrepresent our teaching. What we mean by pleasure is the absence of pain in the body and trouble in the mind. For not a long chain of parties and drunken nights, nor the enjoyment of boys and women, nor a table laden with fish and other extravagances, produces a pleasant life, but rather sober reasoning, which examines the roots of our every choice and avoidance, and drives out those opinions that so greatly disturb our lives. (LM 128-132)

Let’s pull out the highlights:

• “The greatest magnitude of pleasure possible is the removal of all suffering.”

• “Everything we do is for this purpose: the avoidance of pain in our body and fear in our mind.”

• “When all our pain has been relieved, we need no further pleasure.”

• “When we say therefore that pleasure is the goal of life, we do not mean the pleasures of sensualists… What we mean by pleasure is the absence of pain in the body and trouble in the mind.”

This is the explicit and unambiguous content of the core ancient texts from Epicurus himself. It isn’t a single sentence taken out of context, but a clearly repeated emphasis: reducing pain—especially mental pain—is extremely, extremely, important. Most concrete Epicurean advice falls under the pain-reduction headings given here: we should practice prudence and seek to increase our security to avoid physical pain, while systematically removing mental pains such as unjustified fears of the gods, fears of death, and unsatisfiable desires for unhelpful things. So why do some advocates of Epicureanism think this theme should be downplayed?

The Critiques and My Responses

First off, I am glad EpicureanFriends exists. Cassius clearly knows a lot about Epicureanism. I think his arguments highlight important elements in Epicureanism about the appreciation of positive pleasures. When he objects to characterizations of Epicureanism as advocating “a passive, featureless neutral state,” I agree with him. But I think he got a little carried away in his enthusiasm for his argument and is significantly underrating Epicurus’ emphasis on the reduction of pain.

With that attestation of goodwill duly declared, allow me to go through the evidence Cassius proposes in favor of downplaying pain avoidance and more exclusively emphasizing positive pleasures and present my responses. The bold, numbered passages represent paraphrases of or quotations from his points, with my disagreements below.

1. Epicurus believes that a pain-free state is a pleasurable state. Because of this fundamental synonymity, for commentators to emphasize the absence of pain is “a rhetorical [choice], not a philosophical one — and it is a rhetorical choice that consistently misleads general audiences toward passivity and minimalism.”

I disagree with both of the internal claims here: that this doctrine does not represent a significant philosophical choice by Epicurus and that “passivity and minimalism” are the chief implications.

I think Epicurus’ point of emphasis is a very meaningful philosophical choice. Most philosophers don’t argue that the absence of pain is inherently pleasurable. Epicurus is making a distinctive argument that has a very real function: to argue for the importance of pain reduction. This is not mere rhetoric—the consequences are integral to his therapeutic advice, as will become clear below.

As both philosophical argument and rhetorical insistence, furthermore, I would not summarize the direction of this phrasing as pointing “toward passivity and minimalism,” exactly. Towards “tranquility and appreciation of simple things,” perhaps. But even that would be only a partial and indirect train of connection. What it points toward more specifically is the value of eliminating fear and illusion. This isn’t random speculation; it’s what Epicurus says in the subsequent lines of Menoeceus: the preferred alternative to actively accumulating sensual pleasures is not “passivity and minimalism,” it is “sober reasoning, which examines the roots of our every choice and avoidance, and drives out those opinions that so greatly disturb our lives.”

2. People who claim that the Letter to Menoeceus emphasizes the avoidance of pain are considering only “a single sentence torn from context.”

The sentence Cassius quotes is this, in his chosen translation:

When we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality… but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.

There is a lot more than one sentence on this topic in the Letter to Menoeceus. Above, I quote around eight sentences, which comprises a large share of the discussion of pleasure in the LM. Cassius omits three out of the four explicit reiterations of the same point:

Everything we do is for this purpose: the avoidance of pain in our body and fear in our mind.

When pain is removed, no creature feels compelled to travel on in quest of something missing.

When all our pain has been relieved, we need no further pleasure. This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life.

Someone is removing context, but it’s not my team!

3. Principal Doctrine 3 is not what it appears to be in isolation, but rather should be read only as a response to Plato on whether pleasure has a limit. “PD3 tells us the cup is full when it reaches the brim. It says nothing about what fills the cup.”

For reference, Principal Doctrine 3:

The greatest magnitude of pleasure possible is the removal of all suffering. And if our present state is pleasurable, then we are not experiencing pain, nor distress, nor both together.

It is true, Epicurus does teach that pleasure has a limit. This is one of the key innovations of his brand of hedonism. But I think the obvious implication of that point is to deemphasize the pursuit of pleasures. It’s surprising that Cassius decides to appeal to the “full cup” metaphor from Book 6 of Lucretius (a connection he makes explicit below, in point nine), because Lucretius’ point is the opposite of his. In the Lucretian cup analogy, the problem is that the cup has holes that need to be patched. These are pains—things that spoil our happiness, no matter how many pleasures we attempt to pour into our lives. Insofar as PD 3 is focused on the existence of a limit to pleasure, the primary philosophical consequence is to imply that “filling the cup” with ever more discrete instances of pleasure is an ineffective strategy.

Cassius is right in pointing out that PD 3 is not an isolated maxim, but part of an intentional series of Principal Doctrines 1–4 (abbreviated further in the tetrapharmakon). However, looking at this context only underlines the importance of pain reduction in Epicureanism: all four are about pain reduction in the broad sense I describe.

PD 1: Reduce your painful fear of the gods

PD 2: Reduce your painful fear of death

PD 3: Reconsider popular ideas about pleasure and instead prioritize pain removal

PD 4: For pains that you do encounter, here is how to manage them thoughtfully.

This isn’t an accident—everyone agrees these are very central texts to Epicureanism. Only one of the four discusses pleasure and its explicit point is to recast pleasure in terms of the absence of pain. The other three are all about managing pain.

4. In other places, Epicurus describes pleasure in positive terms, not just negative. The most obvious example is from Diogenes Laertius, in which Epicurus is quoted as saying, “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”

On this point, as on some others, Cassius’ argument narrows to the more extreme version of his opposing camp, those who assert that “that the Epicurean goal is a passive, featureless neutral state.” He is correct in saying that would be an inaccurate characterization.

My team in the debate doesn’t deny that positive pleasures exist; we just think Epicurus puts a huge emphasis on pain reduction. What does Epicurus actually recommend in regard to food, sex, and aesthetic stimulation? Mostly prudential avoidance. Excessive gourmandizing is bad for your health and financially costly. Sex can sometimes involve distorting erotic obsession, the complications of family life, or dangers to your health (there are exceptions). In other words: Epicurus’ advice on food, sex, and the rest is mostly about pain reduction.

The quoted sentence, taken in conjunction with the whole body of his related advice, is entirely consistent with my position that Epicurus recognizes positive pleasures, but offers a teaching that focuses largely on pain reduction.

5. “The ancient witnesses are unanimous that the goal is active, vivid pleasure.” Consider these four quotations:

Torquatus (Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman): “Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?”

Diogenes of Oinoanda: “I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a fine anthem to celebrate the fullness of pleasure.”

Cicero: “[The Epicureans said] that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures”

Torquatus: “The wise man is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains.”

These quotes do not say what they are asserted to say. Only two of them—the first and third—give any suggestion of an emphasis on “active, vivid pleasure.” Both are from Cicero, who, as Cassius points out, is a hostile critic rather than a sympathetic Epicurean. As I would interpret that fact, that suggests that he is more likely to distort or misunderstand the teaching. If Cicero is the most explicit voice one can find describing Epicureanism as advocating “a life crammed with pleasures,” you should be suspicious. He phrases it that way because he is maliciously or ignorantly misrepresenting the focus of the philosophy.

Even in those two quotes, the importance of tranquility (i.e. absence of pain) is explicitly included. The other two, meanwhile, are entirely on my side of the argument deemphasizing the pursuit of pleasures. The point of the final Torquatus quote is that if you have adequate wisdom you do not need to pursue pleasures at all. The Diogenes quote says nothing in support of “activeness” or “vividness”: the point of “fullness” of pleasure (εἰς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς πλήρωμα) is satiety and completion. This is entirely consistent with my understanding of Epicurean hedonism: what it offers as an explicit point of contrast with earlier, more simplistic hedonisms, is the possibility of satiety and a deemphasis on “cramming” more pleasures in.

6. Cicero says that the position of freedom of pain being the chief good was the position of Hieronymus of Rhodes, while pleasure being the chief good was the position of Epicurus.

This point again applies only to the more extreme anti-pleasure interpreters. Cassius is right in saying “if you maintain that “absence of pain” rather than pleasure is the true goal of life, you are not an Epicurean.”

I don’t see anything here that conflicts with the opinion of team “Primarily But Not Exclusively,” however. We do not assert that positive pleasures don’t exist or shouldn’t be enjoyed. We maintain only that the enjoyment of accessible pleasures is a relatively simple and straightforward part of the teaching that requires a smaller volume of elucidation and therapeutic attention.

7. Friendship “inevitably ends in grief,” so it could only be advisable if it is counterbalanced by positive pleasures.

This point has no direct quotes from Epicurus, but instead appeals to Frances Wright, presumably because the actual Epicurus quotes on friendship generally trend in the opposite direction. The inevitability of “ending in grief” is not an Epicurean emphasis. The case of losing a friend is brought up in one prominent place that I can remember offhand, with the message of do not grieve:

Those who are able to attain the fullest sense of security from a community live together with the most pleasure, possessing this greatest source of assurance. And having enjoyed the most complete fellowship, they do not grieve when one of their number passes, as if he were to be pitied. (PD 40)

I take “as if he were to be pitied” to be an allusion to the teachings on death: we should not be sad on behalf of departed friends, for they are not suffering. Meanwhile, the continued existence of our larger community of surviving friends means that our own security is not harmed.

Overall, the most distinctive feature of Epicurean friendship is its emphasis on the practical, on how friends are perhaps the crucial tool for achieving security—the avoidance of physical pain and the reduction of fear about physical pain in the future.

8. “‘The Goal of Life Is Absence of Pain’ as a Standalone Phrase Is Liable to Systematic Misinterpretation”

This claim is also narrowly true: misinterpretation can happen and any eight-word motto should be carefully chosen. I agree that this would be a poor choice for an all-encompassing Epicurean motto.

I still stand by the proposition that avoidance of pain is the primary emphasis of Epicurus’ teachings on pleasure. The fact that people are liable to misinterpret the given sentence has no bearing on whether or not my more moderate camp is reading Epicurus correctly.

9. “The appropriate analogy — as used in the opening of Lucretius Book Six — is that of a ‘full cup’… A crammed-full cup is not a description of an ‘absence of pain’ philosophy. It is the description of a philosophy of positive, active, abundant pleasure.”

Let’s look at the Lucretius:

For when [Epicurus] saw that nearly all those things
Which need demands for living were enjoyed
By mortal men, their life established safe
So far as might be, and when he saw them flourish
With all that wealth and praise and honour bring,
And glorying in the fair fame of their sons,
And saw no less that deep in every home
Were aching hearts and torments of the mind
All hapless, self-inflicted without pause
And sorrows breeding furious laments,
He understood then that the vessel itself
Produced the flaw, and by this flaw corrupted
All that came into it however lovely.
He saw that it must leak, being riddled with holes,
And so could not by any means be filled.

– On the Nature of the Universe, 6.9–21, Ronald Melville translation

The whole point of the cup analogy is to show that cramming more stuff in the cup is useless unless we stop the leaks! These twenty lines are about the futility of wealth, praise, and honor (pleasures). The next twenty lines are about the better path: limiting desire and fear.

You can certainly note that the cup contains pleasure. (Though again, the cup’s “crammed”-ness is basically Cicero’s polemical mischaracterization of our goal.) But Lucretius’ obvious emphasis is on stopping the leaks (mental pains) while downplaying the pursuit of positive pleasures. To the degree that the debate is about the degree to which pain avoidance is “primary” to the Epicurean conception of pleasure, I think this analogy is pretty good evidence on my side!

10. The “absence of pain” reading arose from Stoic, religious, and Humanist filters, rather than an objective look at the original Epicurean texts.

People with such sympathies certainly could find something appealing in Epicurus. (That’s not a bad thing.) And perhaps they might then overemphasize this aspect while wrongfully excluding others. (That would be an error in their understanding.) But I don’t believe that either I, O’Keefe, or the other allied scholars are operating through any such filters. The existence of more extreme misreaders leaves plenty of room for those saying that Epicurus emphasized the avoidance of pain.

11. “The Historical Record of Epicurean Lives Contradicts the Ascetic Picture Entirely”

This entry is also limited in its applicability to the more extreme version of the opposing thesis. I would agree that Epicureans are not extremely strict ascetics (though I would still maintain that they are distinctly more moderate in their material consumption than the non-philosophical average, particularly when we focus on the original Epicureans rather than the later Roman followers).

When it comes to the more restrained contention that Epicureanism places a very strong emphasis on avoiding pain, these examples of Epicurean non-asceticism are largely besides the point. It is still true to say that Epicurus emphasized pain reduction. The correct elaboration of this point—the one given by me, O’Keefe, and Epicurus—is not that this implies intense minimalism, but rather that it implies a focus on common sources of mental pain. Our corollary to pain management is not asceticism, but rather claims such as:

• Epicurus thought that correcting misplaced fears about the gods was very important.

• Epicurus thought that correcting misplaced fears about death was very important.

• Epicurus thought that the pursuit of pleasure was often conducted in an unreflective way, in which people often caused themselves pain through an incorrect understanding of the categories of desire.

In Summary

Cassius is right to argue against those who assert that “the Epicurean goal is a passive, featureless neutral state.” But he overstates his case when he implies that the claim that Epicurean hedonistic advice is “primarily about the absence of pain” is fundamentally mistaken. One could quibble over words: perhaps if “about” is taken to mean “fundamentally aimed at,” then his argument is still technically defensible. But I think it is fair to say that he is arguing throughout his piece that the emphasis Epicurus puts on pain reduction is a relatively minor compared to the emphasis he gives to active, positive pleasures.

I think this is mistaken. I think the attention Epicurus gives to pain reduction is quite arguably the most central and distinctive feature of his theory of hedonism. I think O’Keefe’s suggestion that “tranquillist” might be a less misleading term than “hedonist” for general audiences is probably on balance correct. Students of Epicurus can recognize this emphasis without asserting a need for strict ascetism. Students of Epicurus should recognize this emphasis if they want to keep the vital core of the philosophy in focus: eliminating groundless opinions and living a life of thoughtful prudence is the best way to reduce fear and mental disturbance, and this in turn is the most crucial step in enabling a life of pleasure.