O'Keefe's work is detailed and documented and he is a serious scholar. His papers on friendship, natural desires, and wealth are all worth the time to read. But the framing in his paper on Achieving Tranquility is problematic.
O'Keefe writes that Epicurean hedonism is primarily about the reduction of pain.
That single sentence does real damage. Epicurus was explicit. Pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life. Not pain management. Not suffering reduction. Pleasure. Putting pain at the center rather than pleasure doesn't just shift the emphasis - it quietly imports a Buddhist or Stoic prism onto a philosophy that was built in direct opposition to both.
This isn't a minor semantic quibble. A reader who absorbs that Epicureanism is primarily about reducing pain walks away with a completely different philosophy than the one Epicurus actually taught. That framing makes Epicureanism sound like damage control for a life that is fundamentally difficult. The actual philosophy is a full throated argument that pleasure is the natural guide of every living thing from birth and that a life organized around that fact is genuinely available to anyone willing to think clearly about what they actually need.
Epicureanism keeps getting filtered through frameworks that dilute it. Buddhist suffering. Stoic virtue in disguise. Humanist civic obligation. Academic hedging that sands down the sharpest edges. O'Keefe's framing here is a milder version of the same problem. Epicurean philosophy doesn't need rehabilitation or translation into more respectable terms. It needs to be stated as Epicurus stated it.
I think O'Keefe is being entirely true to Epicurus here. The redefinition of pleasure (compared to the popular conception) as the absence of pain is front and center in the core ethical texts.
Principal Doctrine 3 states that "The greatest magnitude of pleasure possible is the removal of all suffering." The Letter to Menoeceus 128 says "Everything we do is for this purpose: the avoidance of pain in our body and fear in our mind." A few lines later comes the sentence you quote, but the full version says this: "For it is when we feel pain from the absence of pleasure that we require pleasure; when all our pain has been relieved, we need no further pleasure. This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life."
As you note, O'Keefe is a serious scholar who makes sure to document his claims well, and there is plenty of evidence for this emphasis in the original texts. The ancient Epicureans clearly talked extensively about pain management, increasing security, and reducing painful emotions, while relegating positive pleasures to minor "variation" rather than actual amplification of happiness.
Those are quotes from the extant texts, but out of context they don't take into account that Epicurus stated there are only two feelings: pleasure and pain. We pursue pleasure and flee from pain. Which means where one is absent, the other is. The absence of pain implies the presence of pleasure. Epicurus explicitly denied the existence of a neutral state. Which is the importance of PD3. In Menoeceus, we need no further pleasure because the absence of pain is replaced by the presence of pleasure. The popular interpretation of emphasizing pleasure = absence of pain seems to me to miss the mirror that absence of pleasure = pain and vice versa.
I certainly don't dispute that Epicurus denied the existence of a neutral state between pleasure and pain. But I don't think this invalidates O'Keefe's perspective that Epicurus emphasizes pain reduction. Do you disagree that this is a major emphasis of the school?
While Epicurus would certainly recognize as good many activities that people think of as pleasures (eating, drinking, comfort, conversation, etc.), a very large proportion of the ethical teachings are occupied with ways of avoiding physical pain (i.e. prudent measures to increase security), managing physical pain (awareness of its limited duration, weighing it against available pleasures), and eliminating mental pain from fear of the gods, fear of death, unsatisfiable desires, misplaced envy, etc.
None of this is to say that "Epicurus didn't recognize positive pleasures"--perhaps my passing statement that Epicurean hedonism is "primarily" about the reduction of pain was a little too brusquely stated. (In my full article on Epicurean hedonism, I unpack this a bit more carefully.) I think it's still fair to say that pain reduction receives the bulk of his therapeutic advice, compared to exhortations to positive pleasures. The encouragement to appreciate available pleasurable states certainly exists in Epicureanism, but I think it's a relatively simpler message, and so he spends more time overall addressing the many ways people cause themselves pain.
I want to emphasize that I applaud what you're doing here on Substack. We need more pro-Epicurean sources out in the world. Thank you for your work!
I agree Epicurus and other Epicurean authors address the pain afflicting people and how to rid oneself of it, but the reason is to allow us to experience pleasure more fully. From the warm sunshine on our face on a summer day to the occasional feast with friends and everything in between. One major concern I have with the "absence of pain" emphasis is how easily it can be misinterpreted as an extreme minimalist asceticism. Flee from pain at all costs. I don't think either of us would say that was Epicurus' teaching. Principle Doctrine 3 is a direct response to other contemporary philosophers who argued pleasure couldn't be the telos because it had no limit. Epicurus says "au contraire" and provides a limit in the removal of all pain. Epicurus calls us to experience the fullness of pleasure built on a firm foundation of freedom from fear, superstition, and anxiety (as you've mentioned in your other posts). That fullness includes freedom from trouble in the mind and body (ataraxia/aponia) but also active joy and delight (khara/euphrosyne).
According to Seneca, the sign on the Garden read "Stranger, here you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure" (hic summum bonum voluptas est - Granted, it would have likely been in Greek) not "our highest good is absence of pain." To me, it's a matter of emphasis. In the end, I'd expect to attract more people to a philosophy emphasizing the honey of pleasure rather than the vinegar of absence of pain.
Thanks for the appreciation and for subscribing--I'm glad to have engaged readers!
I think we don't disagree that much as to the actual substance of each other's claims. You agree that Epicurus addresses pain management; I agree that he encourages the enjoyment of positive pleasures. Our difference, such as it is, is about whether he has a clear emphasis towards one or the other, and even there I wouldn't exactly disagree with you. Epicurus, of course, emphasizes pleasure constantly.
I would still maintain, however, that he very clearly places a strong emphasis on pain reduction as well. This is not to say that his hedonism consists *only* of pain reduction, but that the bulk of his therapeutic advice focuses on different kinds of pain. The first four Principal Doctrines, which most would agree are extremely central to the philosophy, *all* target pain reduction: remove the painful fear of the gods, remove the painful fear of death, think of the absence of pain as pleasurable, and keep the limits of pain in mind.
As an individual advocate, you are certainly welcome to emphasize the positive pleasures. Depending on your audience in a given conversation, that may well be an effective strategy. But for Epicurus, I think the promise of pain reduction was itself conceived of as an appealing "honey." Freeing people from pain certainly isn't vinegar!
Lastly, in a proper explanatory context, I don't think mentioning "reduction of pain" should really evoke a mistaken impression of extreme asceticism. The phrase occurred in this article only as an academic preface, where I myself was pointing out that that phrase alone would be an excessively bald summary that requires a further layer of analysis, preceding an explanation of Epicurean therapy for fears of all kinds. Telling people they don't need to fear death or the gods technically fits into the hedonistic architecture of the philosophy as a form of pain reduction, but doesn't particularly imply anything about standards of ascetism.
O'Keefe's work is detailed and documented and he is a serious scholar. His papers on friendship, natural desires, and wealth are all worth the time to read. But the framing in his paper on Achieving Tranquility is problematic.
O'Keefe writes that Epicurean hedonism is primarily about the reduction of pain.
That single sentence does real damage. Epicurus was explicit. Pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life. Not pain management. Not suffering reduction. Pleasure. Putting pain at the center rather than pleasure doesn't just shift the emphasis - it quietly imports a Buddhist or Stoic prism onto a philosophy that was built in direct opposition to both.
This isn't a minor semantic quibble. A reader who absorbs that Epicureanism is primarily about reducing pain walks away with a completely different philosophy than the one Epicurus actually taught. That framing makes Epicureanism sound like damage control for a life that is fundamentally difficult. The actual philosophy is a full throated argument that pleasure is the natural guide of every living thing from birth and that a life organized around that fact is genuinely available to anyone willing to think clearly about what they actually need.
Epicureanism keeps getting filtered through frameworks that dilute it. Buddhist suffering. Stoic virtue in disguise. Humanist civic obligation. Academic hedging that sands down the sharpest edges. O'Keefe's framing here is a milder version of the same problem. Epicurean philosophy doesn't need rehabilitation or translation into more respectable terms. It needs to be stated as Epicurus stated it.
Pleasure is the guide of life.
I think O'Keefe is being entirely true to Epicurus here. The redefinition of pleasure (compared to the popular conception) as the absence of pain is front and center in the core ethical texts.
Principal Doctrine 3 states that "The greatest magnitude of pleasure possible is the removal of all suffering." The Letter to Menoeceus 128 says "Everything we do is for this purpose: the avoidance of pain in our body and fear in our mind." A few lines later comes the sentence you quote, but the full version says this: "For it is when we feel pain from the absence of pleasure that we require pleasure; when all our pain has been relieved, we need no further pleasure. This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life."
As you note, O'Keefe is a serious scholar who makes sure to document his claims well, and there is plenty of evidence for this emphasis in the original texts. The ancient Epicureans clearly talked extensively about pain management, increasing security, and reducing painful emotions, while relegating positive pleasures to minor "variation" rather than actual amplification of happiness.
Those are quotes from the extant texts, but out of context they don't take into account that Epicurus stated there are only two feelings: pleasure and pain. We pursue pleasure and flee from pain. Which means where one is absent, the other is. The absence of pain implies the presence of pleasure. Epicurus explicitly denied the existence of a neutral state. Which is the importance of PD3. In Menoeceus, we need no further pleasure because the absence of pain is replaced by the presence of pleasure. The popular interpretation of emphasizing pleasure = absence of pain seems to me to miss the mirror that absence of pleasure = pain and vice versa.
I certainly don't dispute that Epicurus denied the existence of a neutral state between pleasure and pain. But I don't think this invalidates O'Keefe's perspective that Epicurus emphasizes pain reduction. Do you disagree that this is a major emphasis of the school?
While Epicurus would certainly recognize as good many activities that people think of as pleasures (eating, drinking, comfort, conversation, etc.), a very large proportion of the ethical teachings are occupied with ways of avoiding physical pain (i.e. prudent measures to increase security), managing physical pain (awareness of its limited duration, weighing it against available pleasures), and eliminating mental pain from fear of the gods, fear of death, unsatisfiable desires, misplaced envy, etc.
None of this is to say that "Epicurus didn't recognize positive pleasures"--perhaps my passing statement that Epicurean hedonism is "primarily" about the reduction of pain was a little too brusquely stated. (In my full article on Epicurean hedonism, I unpack this a bit more carefully.) I think it's still fair to say that pain reduction receives the bulk of his therapeutic advice, compared to exhortations to positive pleasures. The encouragement to appreciate available pleasurable states certainly exists in Epicureanism, but I think it's a relatively simpler message, and so he spends more time overall addressing the many ways people cause themselves pain.
I want to emphasize that I applaud what you're doing here on Substack. We need more pro-Epicurean sources out in the world. Thank you for your work!
I agree Epicurus and other Epicurean authors address the pain afflicting people and how to rid oneself of it, but the reason is to allow us to experience pleasure more fully. From the warm sunshine on our face on a summer day to the occasional feast with friends and everything in between. One major concern I have with the "absence of pain" emphasis is how easily it can be misinterpreted as an extreme minimalist asceticism. Flee from pain at all costs. I don't think either of us would say that was Epicurus' teaching. Principle Doctrine 3 is a direct response to other contemporary philosophers who argued pleasure couldn't be the telos because it had no limit. Epicurus says "au contraire" and provides a limit in the removal of all pain. Epicurus calls us to experience the fullness of pleasure built on a firm foundation of freedom from fear, superstition, and anxiety (as you've mentioned in your other posts). That fullness includes freedom from trouble in the mind and body (ataraxia/aponia) but also active joy and delight (khara/euphrosyne).
According to Seneca, the sign on the Garden read "Stranger, here you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure" (hic summum bonum voluptas est - Granted, it would have likely been in Greek) not "our highest good is absence of pain." To me, it's a matter of emphasis. In the end, I'd expect to attract more people to a philosophy emphasizing the honey of pleasure rather than the vinegar of absence of pain.
Thanks for the appreciation and for subscribing--I'm glad to have engaged readers!
I think we don't disagree that much as to the actual substance of each other's claims. You agree that Epicurus addresses pain management; I agree that he encourages the enjoyment of positive pleasures. Our difference, such as it is, is about whether he has a clear emphasis towards one or the other, and even there I wouldn't exactly disagree with you. Epicurus, of course, emphasizes pleasure constantly.
I would still maintain, however, that he very clearly places a strong emphasis on pain reduction as well. This is not to say that his hedonism consists *only* of pain reduction, but that the bulk of his therapeutic advice focuses on different kinds of pain. The first four Principal Doctrines, which most would agree are extremely central to the philosophy, *all* target pain reduction: remove the painful fear of the gods, remove the painful fear of death, think of the absence of pain as pleasurable, and keep the limits of pain in mind.
As an individual advocate, you are certainly welcome to emphasize the positive pleasures. Depending on your audience in a given conversation, that may well be an effective strategy. But for Epicurus, I think the promise of pain reduction was itself conceived of as an appealing "honey." Freeing people from pain certainly isn't vinegar!
Lastly, in a proper explanatory context, I don't think mentioning "reduction of pain" should really evoke a mistaken impression of extreme asceticism. The phrase occurred in this article only as an academic preface, where I myself was pointing out that that phrase alone would be an excessively bald summary that requires a further layer of analysis, preceding an explanation of Epicurean therapy for fears of all kinds. Telling people they don't need to fear death or the gods technically fits into the hedonistic architecture of the philosophy as a form of pain reduction, but doesn't particularly imply anything about standards of ascetism.
Thanks for the gracious, thoughtful responses and engagement. I look forward to continuing to read your material here on Substack.