Translation Tuesday: Letter to Menoeceus, Part 3
Pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life
Know that some desires are natural, while others are groundless, and of the natural desires some are necessary, while others are not. Of the necessary desires, some are necessary for happiness, some to pacify the body’s demands, and some for life itself.
Keeping these facts in unwavering focus allows us to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the serenity of the soul, for to secure these is the object of a blessed life. Everything we do is for this purpose: the avoidance of pain in our body and fear in our mind.
When we achieve this state, the storm inside of us goes quiet: when pain is removed, no creature feels compelled to travel on in quest of something missing, searching for something else to complete the good of its body and soul. For it is when we feel pain from the absence of pleasure that we require pleasure; when all our pain has been relieved, we need no further pleasure. This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life.
Indeed, having judged pleasure to be our first and innate good, from this we begin our every choice and avoidance, and to this we refer as our standard of judgment, measuring every good according to this feeling.
Pleasure is our first good and natural to us, and for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, for there are often times when we pass over opportunities for pleasure if greater difficulties will follow them. Likewise, we consider many pains to be preferable to initial pleasures, if greater pleasures will follow after we submit to them for a time. And so every pleasure is good, and is by nature fitting for us, but not every pleasure is to be chosen. In the same way, every pain is bad, but not every pain is to be avoided.
Indeed, all things should be judged through comparison, and through a consideration of their advantages and disadvantages. For sometimes we will treat a good thing as bad or a bad thing as good.
Commentary
In our third installment of the Letter to Menoeceus, we move on from discussions of the gods and death and arrive at another core Epicurean teaching: the proper classification of desires and the case for hedonism. You might think the latter of these to be the more foundational and expect it to be covered first, but in fact Epicurus starts with the classification of desires. This is characteristic of the empirical or even anthropological approach of the school: it is by observing the various things that humans do desire that we can form an accurate general theory of what will conduce to happiness.
Know that some desires are natural, while others are groundless, and of the natural desires some are necessary, while others are not. Of the necessary desires, some are necessary for happiness, some to pacify the body’s demands, and some for life itself.
These short lines are extremely important to Epicurean ethics. The most fundamental scheme of categorization gives us three families of desire: the natural and necessary, the natural and unnecessary, and those which are not natural or necessary, described here as kenai, meaning groundless, empty, or pointless. (These descriptions are admittedly a mouthful: I rather like Emily Austin’s shorthand terms of “necessary,” “extravagant,” and “corrosive” desires.) Epicurus’ helpful elaboration of what he considers necessary allows us to fill out this taxonomy a little more:
Natural and necessary:
For life itself: food, drink, basic shelter
For the resolution of bodily pain: Some pains won’t kill us immediately (physical discomfort, moderate cold), but they will pester us incessantly until we resolve them.
For happiness: As he will elaborate, the mental side of contentment mostly means freedom from fear. Epicurus believes tranquility requires a sense of security, achieved through things like a correct understanding of the world and friendship.
Natural but not necessary: Austin’s “extravagant” is correct—these are desires that are natural and fine to indulge, but which will not harm us if they are lacking. More tasty food, more comfortable clothing, and enjoyment of the arts seem to belong here according to Epicurus. He also generally puts sex in this category, although sometimes that gets more complicated: for some people the desire for sex seems to approach “necessary” in its inescapability, while for others it can get mixed up with unhealthy erotic obsession, which the Epicureans recognize as detrimental to happiness.
Neither natural nor necessary: The main traits of these desires are 1) that they do not actually contribute to the satisfaction of our natural desires for freedom from bodily pain and mental disturbance, and 2) that they cannot be satisfied. The desire for wealth or power would fall into this category. Austin calls them “corrosive,” because indulging them has negative effects. You could also simply call them “mistaken,” because they are based on an incorrect belief that their pursuit will lead to greater comfort or security. Epicurus believes this is simply wrong: the acquisition of wealth and power is more likely to disturb our peace of mind than add to it. Much more on this to come.
Keeping these facts in unwavering focus allows us to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the serenity of the soul, for to secure these is the object of a blessed life. Everything we do is for this purpose: the avoidance of pain in our body and fear in our mind.
Here we find some important philosophical vocabulary. The “object” of our life is a rendering of telos, a word which you will also see rendered as “goal,” “end,” or simply kept in the Greek due to its philosophical prominence. Another such word is ataraxia, translated here as “serenity.” “Tranquility” would also work. (The adjectival form, ataraktos, is our namesake condition—untroubled.)
For Epicurus, as for Aristotle, our proper telos is our own eudaimonia, or happiness. This essential egoism was the standard view in ancient Greek philosophy, reflecting the commonsense idea that it is right and natural for us to pursue our own well-being. I would say that is still the commonsense view of the majority of people, most of the time, even though many modern philosophers contest the idea that our own happiness is our only ethical imperative. Where Epicureanism differs from other ancient schools is the identification of eudaimonia with painlessness in the body and untroubledness in the mind.
When we achieve this state, the storm inside of us goes quiet: when pain is removed, no creature feels compelled to travel on in quest of something missing, searching for something else to complete the good of its body and soul. For it is when we feel pain from the absence of pleasure that we require pleasure; when all our pain has been relieved, we need no further pleasure. This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life.
Indeed, having judged pleasure to be our first and innate good, from this we begin our every choice and avoidance, and to this we refer as our standard of judgment, measuring every good according to this feeling.
Here is where Epicurus makes his controversial claim that the limit of pleasure is the removal of all pain (also seen in Principal Doctrine 3). He maintains that if all pain is truly removed, any further pleasurable sensations would at best consist only in variation, rather than true augmentation, of pleasure. If we have no hunger, we will take no pleasure in further food. If we are warm and dry, the softness of our bedsheets is immaterial. At some point, I’ll dedicate a whole essay to this doctrine, but for now it is important to recognize Epicurus’ stark refutation of the usual accusations of a low and sensual hedonism: for him, pleasure is the removal of pain.
Pleasure is our first good and natural to us, and for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, for there are often times when we pass over opportunities for pleasure if greater difficulties will follow them. Likewise, we consider many pains to be preferable to initial pleasures, if greater pleasures will follow after we submit to them for a time. And so every pleasure is good, and is by nature fitting for us, but not every pleasure is to be chosen. In the same way, every pain is bad, but not every pain is to be avoided.
Indeed, all things should be judged through comparison, and through a consideration of their advantages and disadvantages. For sometimes we will treat a good thing as bad or a bad thing as good.
Rounding out his initial theoretical overview of pleasure, Epicurus here introduces something very similar to what will become known as the “hedonic calculus” in the Utilitarian tradition of Jeremy Bentham. The language is now familiar to any philosophy undergraduate, while the idea should be familiar to any prudent person: a thoughtful hedonist does not grasp at any seeming pleasure that presents itself, but instead considers the total net pleasure that is likely to result from a given course of action.
Eating ice cream is pleasurable, but eating a whole tub will make my stomach feel uncomfortable. I will go to the dentist and give them money to perform an uncomfortable procedure on my teeth because if I don’t I will experience more pain in the future. Restraining overall spending and increasing savings leads to greater security in old age.
Such are my examples. Next week, Epicurus will give us some of his own, diving deeper into the application of his hedonistic theory. We’ll be talking about frugality vs. fish, unrestrained lust vs. sober reasoning, and the paramount importance of phronesis, or practical wisdom. Don’t miss it.
Original Text
ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.
[128] τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν.
ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· <ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν> οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.
[129] ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.
καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἕπηται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθὸν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἱρετή· καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα.
[130] τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει. χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ κατά τινας χρόνους ὡς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τοὔμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ.