Principal Doctrine 36:
In general terms, what is just is the same for all: something that is advantageous in our association with each other. But when it comes to what is particular to a place or any other circumstances, it does not follow that what is just is the same for all.
Principal Doctrine 37:
Of the things adopted under the law as just, that which on examination proves to be useful in our dealings with one another bears the true hallmark of justice, whether it is the same in all places or not. But if one establishes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in our dealings with one another, this no longer possesses the nature of a just thing. If a law fit our concept of what is just for some time—even if what is useful in the context of justice changes—it was nonetheless just for that time, at least for those not confusing themselves with empty sounds but simply looking to the facts.
Principal Doctrine 38:
When circumstances have not changed, and the laws previously held to be just are shown not to fit with our concept of what is just, then those things were not just. But when circumstances have changed, and those things that had been established as just are no longer useful, then they were just only while they were useful between members of the community, but they were no longer just when they were no longer useful.
Commentary
In my last two posts on the Principal Doctrines, I first introduced the Epicurean theory of justice (PD 31–33), then discussed some of its implications for individual conduct (PD 34–35). Today’s maxims wrap up the Principal Doctrines’ main coverage of the topic by turning to wider social questions. Can laws differ in different places or at different times, but still be just? Or will the rules of justice look the same everywhere and at all times? What does this imply about efforts to critique or change current laws?
Epicurus addresses the first two of these questions head-on in our first maxim, PD 36:
In general terms, what is just is the same for all: something that is advantageous in our association with each other. But when it comes to what is particular to a place or any other circumstances, it does not follow that what is just is the same for all. (PD 36)
This saying first recaps the basic theory we met in PD 31–33: a law or other arrangement is just if it is conductive to mutual advantage in our social interactions. The word translated here as “advantageous” is sumpheron (συμφέρον). Sometimes I translate it as “what is useful,” which is a more everyday equivalent to what has become known in modern philosophy as “utility.” Given Epicureanism’s hedonism, utility is technically equivalent to pleasure, but just as with Bentham’s and Mill’s adoption of the word “utility,” sumpheron has a suitably generalizing connotation: the advantages we derive from social cooperation are extremely varied and go well beyond what everyday people might think of when hearing the word “pleasure.” We agree not to intentionally harm one another, we agree to follow the same rules of the road, we agree to pay taxes to fund shared services—all of these arrangements are useful and promote the general utility.
That general characteristic of justice is universal: if a given arrangement is destructive to the common utility, then it cannot be just. The specifics, however, vary. Laws or cultural mores will be different in different places, without any necessary implication of injustice. Sometimes, these differences may be fairly arbitrary: in some countries, people drive on the right side of the road, in others they drive on the left. In others, they may be historically contingent: the governing rules of a primitive warlike tribe probably look different than those of a complex modern democracy. Imposing the rules of one onto the circumstances of the other would not necessarily be advantageous to the society as a whole—on average, societies will tend to adopt rules that convey some kind of advantage.
Epicurus elaborates on the topic of how laws1 change over time in the next two maxims.
Of the things adopted under the law as just, that which on examination proves to be useful in our dealings with one another bears the true hallmark of justice, whether it is the same in all places or not. But if one establishes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in our dealings with one another, this no longer possesses the nature of a just thing. If a law fit our concept of what is just for some time—even if what is useful in the context of justice changes—it was nonetheless just for that time, at least for those not confusing themselves with empty sounds but simply looking to the facts. (PD 37)
Something is “just” as long as it is useful—this is the principal criterion we should look to. It doesn’t matter if a legal arrangement is different in another state. And it may be true that circumstances may change in the future, such that old laws will need to be updated. But if a given law was felt by the participating citizens to be mutually beneficial and advantageous, then opinions in other places or at other times, grounded in entirely different circumstances, may not be very relevant.
Two more notes on this maxim. First, Epicurus refers to “our concept of what is just.” The word translated here as “concept” is the famous Epicurean prolepsis. This is a word that has been the subject of much debate and controversy, which I mostly don’t want to get into here.2 Put simply, Epicurus believes we have essentially innate and universal ideas of certain things that are not really subject to dispute, and which we can therefore take as starting points for our discussions. For instance, in the Letter to Menoeceus, he says that our prolepsis of gods is of immortal and perfectly untroubled beings—it is inherently contradictory to speak of petty, fickle gods. (There is still plenty of debate as to what exactly Epicurus did think the gods were really like.) In today’s maxim, Epicurus seems to be asserting that the definition he has offered for justice (that what is just is what is mutually advantageous) is similarly intrinsic to the basic idea we all have of the concept: the exact laws that are most conductive to mutual advantage may vary over time, but the fact that a law must be conductive to mutual advantage to be considered just does not vary. If we start to point to some other abstract principle in favor of real-world benefit when defining what is just, we are on the wrong track.
Second, Epicurus first broaches an important subject in this maxim: the case of unjust laws. “If one establishes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful,” then it is not just. While Epicurus in some sense may seem to equate the laws with justice, that does not mean that the act of setting something into writing as a legal statue automatically and absolutely confers the status of “just.” He elaborates on the two ways this can come about in our final doctrine:
When circumstances have not changed, and the laws previously held to be just are shown not to fit with our concept of what is just, then those things were not just. But when circumstances have changed, and those things that had been established as just are no longer useful, then they were just only while they were useful between members of the community, but they were no longer just when they were no longer useful. (PD 38)
Either 1) circumstances have not changed, but we realize that our laws were never just to begin with, or 2) circumstances have changed, and formerly just laws are no longer just, because they are no longer mutually advantageous. This offers a very direct clarification of two frequent misconceptions about Epicureanism. Many think that we are incapable of criticizing the established political order—we’re not! Others think that our endorsement of a kind of social contract theory as the basis of justice implies complete relativism, with no objective standards—that’s not right either. We are fully capable of recognizing when a society’s laws are destructive to their internal happiness. We just make sure we keep that internal effect central in our evaluation, rather than turning to some external and unchanging ideal form of Justice as our arbiter.
What remains true is that the critique of existing political arrangements is not generally central to the Epicurean project. The reason for this is latent everywhere in our ethical advice: most political arrangements do not determine our ability to satisfy our truly necessary desires, efforts to change political realities requires a lot of competition and uncertainty that on average will have a negative hedonic impact on our lives, and the basic rules of prudence will usually show us that our highest payoff efforts will usually focus on things that are more closely under our control.
I agree that this is the sweet spot of wisdom, and well-timed for election day here in the US: the Epicurean can recognize that current political arrangements are not optimal (they never are!), while also declining to grant such external problems significant influence over his or her own happiness. People on the political left can point out things they would like to change—sometimes I agree! People on the political right can point out things they would like to change—sometimes I agree with them! Legal structures are always an evolving approximation of the just, an ongoing attempt to advance the general utility. To postpone your happiness until more perfect laws have been achieved is to postpone your happiness forever.
It would be very difficult to make the case that our contemporary political woes are objectively more challenging to human well-being than those with which Epicurus was familiar: he saw Athens starving and besieged, shifting between half a dozen different military overlords over the course of his life. And throughout these several challenging decades, he continued to invite students from all walks of life—foreigners, women, slaves—to pursue lives of joy and pleasure. Epicurus could certainly imagine a more widely beneficial set of social arrangements. He chose to focus his efforts, however, where they could do the most good: close to home.
Explore the complete series on the Principal Doctrines here.
Original Text
36. κατὰ μὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό· συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δήποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.
37. τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων, ἔχει τὸ τοῦ δικαίου ἐνέχυρον, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται, ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό· ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δίκαιου φύσιν ἔχει· κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν.
38. ἔνθα, μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων, ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἐναρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια· ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δέ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, ὕστερον δʼ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν.
I believe both PD 37 and PD 38 are primarily focused on formal, legal embodiments of justice. There is a little ambiguity: the Greek phrase τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων could be understood as either “things believed to be just” or “things adopted under the law as just.” (Inwood & Gerson favor the first; Bailey and Strodach the second, to glance at just a few translators.) I think the rest of the context clearly points to the legal interpretation, however: PD 37 talks about laying down a law (τιθέναι νόμον), PD 38 talks about things “established” (κεῖμαι) as just, and PD 38 talks about justice as arising from things useful among those living together as citizens (συμπολιτευομένων). All of these words point strongly to formal legal and political contexts.
The best introductory account of the confusion over prolepses remains that beginning on page 142 of Normal DeWitt’s Epicurus and His Philosophy.
This reminds me of the problem of undue denial of consent, which we have discussed at Society of Epicurus in relation to Principal Doctrine 32 but is also relevant here.
This arose from various case studies that we placed before our eyes. Africans who were captured centuries ago and enslaved would have been able and willing to enter into covenants, as much as the Africans and others who sold them into slavery and those who bought them. However, these individuals were denied consent and treated as children, or as wild beasts, as if they had neither the power nor the will to give consent. Women and other groups are often also denied consent in some societies.
Creatures who do not abide in social contract inhabit a sort of wild or pre-civilized state according to PD 32. But in cases such as these, the enslavers or oppressors are the ones who chose to remain in a wild state, insofar as they had the power, but not the willingness to make agreements with others.
These case studies have led some of us to consider inherently unjust the denial of consent.