Principal Doctrine 39:
The man who manages the insecurity of the outside world in the best way does three things. The forces he can render friendly to himself, he does. If this is not possible, he makes them at least not hostile. And if even that is not possible, he avoids contact, and excludes from his life those for whom it is best to do so.
Principal Doctrine 40:
Those who attain a state of confidence procure this above all from those around them. Such persons live together with the greatest pleasure, heartened by this most secure assurance. And having obtained this perfect fellowship, they do not grieve when one of their number passes, as if he were to be pitied.
Commentary
Today we arrive at the final installment of my 15-part series on Epicurus’ Principal Doctrines. Along with the Letter to Menoeceus, this collection of forty maxims comprises the most central ethical texts to come down to us from Epicurus himself. Unlike the Vatican Sayings or modern anthologies of assorted fragments, the Principal Doctrines were actually conceived of as an intentional and coherent set of teachings. There are few significant ethical topics in the Epicurean system that are not addressed within these maxims. Ancient testimonies report that practicing Epicureans would constantly study and memorize these sayings. I encourage the same.
Two ways of studying the ancient maxims are to translate them for oneself and to write down one’s own reflections on them. Whenever I spend some time doing so, I find that I come away with a deeper understanding of these sayings, which can easily seem obscure or cryptic to new students of Epicureanism. This can especially be the case when studying them through translations that often have not prioritized readability. Principle Doctrine 39 is a good example of a maxim that has frequently been rendered into nearly incomprehensible translationese by overly literal scholars. I think most commentators fundamentally agree, however, that this is what it means:
The man who manages the insecurity of the outside world in the best way does three things. The forces he can render friendly to himself, he does. If this is not possible, he makes them at least not hostile. And if even that is not possible, he avoids contact, and excludes from his life those for whom it is best to do so. (PD 39)
Most basically, we are dealing with the question of how we should deal with other people. Epicureans are often simplistically thought of as “advocating friendship.” We do, of course. But we also recognize that not everyone is going to be a suitable candidate for the kind of deep trust and complete reliability that a truly valuable friendship entails. For many of the people we encounter, then, we will have more restrained goals: either to achieve a peaceable neutrality, or to simply avoid those with whom contact is detrimental to our goals or happiness.
The biggest issues in translating this saying stem from the phrase I have rendered as “the forces he can render friendly to himself” and its subsequent parallels. Most English editions insist on rendering Epicurus’ neuter plural blankly and literally as “things” and the word homophyla (ὁμόφυλα) as “akin to oneself,” or the like. Bailey, for instance, writes about one who “has made those things that he could akin to himself.” Strodach similarly writes about someone who has “assimilated to himself what he could.” Such translations obscure that we are talking about people and rendering them friendly towards us.
At a glance, you might think I am being excessively loose and potentially distorting, to make this so much more explicit than the standard scholars’ translations. I don’t think I am: despite the neuter plural (think of it as “in cases in which” if you like), I think the context is clearly about interpersonal relationships. We’ve just had eight maxims about the contractual nature of justice and will then close out the collection with another about friendship and community: such relations between people is the subject here as well. What’s more, those previous translators fundamentally agree with me in their commentaries: Bailey says that the saying is about “friendship” and that the “neuter really implies persons” (372) and Strodach says it is about how the Epicurean “seeks to win like-minded persons to his way of life.” (238).1
So why do the translators persist in using phrases such as “who has made the manageable things akin to himself” (Inwood and Gerson) instead of “who has made friends where he is able to” or the like? This is pointless and counterproductive pedantry that makes Epicurus look like he is writing gibberish and shuts readers out from the substance of his advice. I am forced to conclude that either the guild of ancient philosophy translators has collectively adopted deeply unhelpful and obscurantist practices, or I am simply the best and most lucid translator to ever attempt to bring Epicurus to the world.
Back to the philosophical substance. I think this trichotomy of human relations (friendship-neutrality-avoidance) is very important and often underrecognized in Epicureanism. It is well known that we value friendship highly. In discussing PD 33, we addressed the Epicurean theory of justice, discussing how humans form agreements for mutual benefit on both small and large scales, a phenomenon of which friendship can be considered a key small-scale example. Other maxims have explicitly addressed the prudential benefits of friendship. But a vital corollary of our insistence on the security-enhancing benefit of friendship is that friends must be very trustworthy. Friendships worthy of the name do not spring up on every corner, ready and available to be effortlessly collected. Truly reliable friends represent a minority of our social contacts.
Epicureanism, therefore, does not imply straightforward extroversion or frivolous sociability. If anything, I might suggest that the school leans in the opposite direction: to intentionally cultivate an inner circle of deep trust requires focus and selectivity. For the mass of the world, neutrality is probably our more common attitude. We aren’t going to invest lots of time and effort into accumulating superficial relationships, because we recognize that insubstantial bonds are insubstantial—they are unlikely to provide the deep sense of security we value so highly. An acquaintance at your fitness class is not your spouse, the clerk at the store is not your father, the people at the party are not the friends you’ll stay with if your house burns down. If you do meet a viable candidate for such a role, great—but most people are not going to fall into that category, for whatever assorted reasons of untrustworthiness, undesirable character traits, misguided beliefs, or temperamental incompatibility.
With most of the world, then, be neutral. Be polite and affable, but not unnecessarily obsequious. Avoid provoking antagonism, hostility, or disdain, but don’t excessively value the approval, praise, or patronage of the general public. And if occasionally you run into people who persist in exhibiting such hostility or disdain, or who bring your life nothing but gloom and complaint, then avoid spending your time trying to placate or manage them. You will be happier when your life is passed mostly with a tight-knit circle of those you trust, along with a background of generally agreeable but essentially neutral minor characters.
And it is to that tight-knit circle we turn in the final entry of the Principal Doctrines:
Those who attain a state of confidence procure this above all from those around them. Such persons live together with the greatest pleasure, heartened by this most secure assurance. And having obtained this perfect fellowship, they do not grieve when one of their number passes, as if he were to be pitied.2 (PD 40)
The previous maxim introduced a trichotomy: aim for friendship with some, neutrality with others, and avoidance when needed. PD 40 zooms in one last time on the importance of that first category, appropriately closing the whole cycle with an emphatic return to several key Epicurean claims: friendship is vital, it brings us the greatest security and pleasure, and not even death can disturb the tranquility of those who achieve this happy existence.
Back in my commentary on PD 28, I shared several other passages elaborating on the practical importance of friendship to Epicureans. I won’t retread all that ground here: suffice it to say that Epicurus believes strongly, as he indicates in this maxim, that friendship brings us:
Greater grounds for confidence (τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν, literally the ability or means of feeling secure)
A sense of mental assurance (πίστωμα ἔχοντες, literally having a “pledge” or “guarantee”)
A shared life of pleasure (ἐβίωσαν μετʼ αλλήλων ἥδιστα, “they live most pleasurably together”)
This final maxim appropriately encapsulates the Epicurean vision of a good life. In contrast to some rival schools, the Principal Doctrines conclude not with some vision of transcendent communion with abstract ideas or an exhortation to individual firmness, but with a depiction of a group of people living together in pleasure. When physical security, mental security, and fellowship combine, there are no further obstacles to happiness. Some might say that death will put an end to such pleasure, and that no bonds of trusting friends can defend against that fate. This is factually true; Epicurus does not peddle fictions that friendships will continue in some other realm after death.
But as he has taught before, in the earliest of the Principle Doctrines, death is merely the ending of sensation and not something to be either feared for ourselves or pitied on behalf of others. All lives end in death. But a happy life is a happy life. There is no higher goal.
Explore the complete series on the Principal Doctrines here.
Original Text
39. ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος, οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο, τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε· ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμικτος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξωρίσατο ὅσα τοῦτʼ ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν.
40. ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορούντων παρασκευάσασθαι, οὗτοι καὶ ἐβίωσαν μετʼ αλλήλων ἥδιστα τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα ἔχοντες, καὶ πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οὐκ ὠδύραντο ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφήν.
Norman DeWitt is on my side of this initial translation question, rendering the phrase in question as being about the man “who has made relationships friendly wherever possible.” He does adopt a less-likely emendation in the latter part of his translation however, choosing to follow Usener in emending the agreed-to-be-corrupt ἐξηρίσατο to ἐξηρέσατο (“win over by gifts,” or “sought dynastic protection” in DeWitt’s rendering) rather than the more commonly adopted ἐξωρίσατο (expel, banish, exclude). The latter seems to make more sense to me.
I don’t want to derail the main text again with complaints about other translations, but the Inwood and Gerson translation is perhaps even more explicitly wrong here when it says, “acquire the greatest confidence from [the threats posed by] their neighbors.” (Bailey makes a similar mistake.) Geert Roskam discusses extensively and, I think, demonstrates conclusively, that Epicurus is talking about acquiring security from one’s “confined circle of acquaintances” rather than about achieving security against one’s neighbors. It seems like a silly mistake for eminent scholars to make, but ἐκ simply does not mean “from” in the sense of “against”—it means “from” in the sense of “acquired from.” I also follow Roskam in taking “most” (μάλιστα) as modifying “from his neighbors” rather than the “means of security.” For more, see Roskam’s excellent Live Unnoticed: On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine, 40.
Also, I agree with Bailey that Inwood and Gerson are wrong in thinking that προκαταστροφήν means “an early death.” It simply means “one who has predeceased [themselves].” Epicurus doesn’t worry about “premature” deaths and that would be a strangely narrow topic to end on. He is talking about any death of a friend or family member that comes before our own.


Translation is a huge issue. For example, we have three translations of "Outlines of Pyrrhonism." The oldest, from the 1930s, was by Bury, who was a prolific translator but who didn't have much understanding of what he was translating. In the 1990s we first got a translation by Annas and Barnes, but it's a hostile translation. Barnes doesn't mince words about how he detests Pyrrhonism. Then we got a good translation from Benson Mates, who recognized that a lot of the key words are untranslatable and simply transliterates them.
Hello Jack, I'm curious on the last sentence of PD 40 "they do not grieve when one of their number passes, as if he were to be pitied."
This seems like a very altruistic sentiment to end on, but I've also seen it rendered as something like "they do not lament when one of their number passes, as if it were a call for pity", the basic idea is that since they have great security still, they do not lament a friend's passing. Which makes more sense with Epicurus psychological hedonism to me at least.
Curious your thoughts on this reading.