Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, X.135–138
Epicurus rejects divination entirely in several places, including in the Short Summary. He says, “Divination does not exist, and even if it did exist, you should still hold events to be ultimately unimportant to us.” And so much for his treatment of ethics, which has been discussed more elsewhere.
He differs from the Cyrenaics regarding pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only active pleasure, while he accepts both, in the soul and in the body, as he says in On Choice and Avoidance, in On Ends, in the first book of On Lives, and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Diogenes, in the 17th book of his Selections, and Metrodorus, in his Timocrates, likewise say that pleasure can be conceived in both active and static forms. Epicurus, in his On Choices, says “Freedom from mental distress and freedom from bodily pain are both static pleasures, while joy and delight are considered to be active and involving motion.
In this also he differs from the Cyrenaics: they hold that bodily suffering is worse than mental suffering, for wrongdoers are punished in their bodies. Epicurus, however, considers mental suffering to be worse, for the flesh feels its distress only in the present, while the soul’s suffering encompasses the past, present, and future. In the same way, he holds the pleasures of the soul to be greater than those of the body.
As proof that pleasure is our goal, he observes that as soon as living creatures are born they take satisfaction in pleasure and avoid pain, naturally and without reasoning. We flee suffering, therefore, instinctively. It is in this way that Heracles shouts out as he is devoured by the shirt [of Nessus]:
With him weeping and crying out, the rocks were moaning, Locris’ mountain peaks and the heights of Euboea.
Epicurus says that the virtues are chosen not for themselves, but for the sake of pleasure, just as we choose medicine for the sake of health. In the 20th book of the Selections, Diogenes says this too. He also says that education is something that continues throughout one’s life. And Epicurus says that only virtue is inseparable from pleasure, while other things, such as the food we eat, can be separated.
Come now, then, and let us put the crown, as one might say, to this whole book and to this philosopher’s biography. By presenting his Principal Doctrines and with them closing the whole work, we shall use for our ending the beginning of happiness.
Commentary
Epicurus advocates for the pursuit of pleasure. Everyone knows that. But there are constant misapprehensions regarding what he means by that seemingly simple word. In today’s extremely helpful passage from Diogenes Laertius, we’ll touch on all the big distinctions: active vs. static, physical vs. mental, positive vs. negative, psychologically all-encompassing vs. arbitrarily restrictive. If you want to pursue pleasure successfully, these are crucial principles to understand.
The passage above comes from Diogenes Laertius’ biography of Epicurus, and is composed of an assemblage of semi-random paraphrase and quotation from various Epicurean texts, inserted between the Letter to Menoeceus and the Principal Doctrines. (In two previous installments, I translated and discussed the section describing the Epicurean “wise man” that comes before the Letter to Menoeceus.) Let’s dive in.
Epicurus rejects divination entirely in several places, including in the Short Summary. He says, “Divination does not exist, and even if it did exist, you should still hold events to be ultimately unimportant to us.” And so much for his treatment of ethics, which has been discussed more elsewhere.
This opening passage demonstrates the haphazard approach to composition characteristic of Diogenes Laertius, inserting a random observation on divination into an unrelated context before announcing the end of the ethical discussion, somewhat prematurely. (It is possible that our manuscripts have been distorted by copyist errors as well.) In any case, as one would expect of the materialist Epicureans, prophecy is not taken seriously—the modern popularity of astrology and continued financial viability of psychic mediums suggests the world at large is still catching up with Epicurean good sense. The phrase stating that events are “ultimately unimportant to us” is a tiny bit ambiguous in the original1, but I think must mean something generally analogous to Principal Doctrine 16:
Chance intrudes little in the life of the wise man, for reasoned calculation has governed, does govern, and will govern the greatest and most important things continuously throughout his life. (PD 16)
Even if we could know the outcome of various future events, this information is of very limited importance to a wise and prudent person, who generally arranges his life in such a way that his happiness is not dependent on any one particular event turning out in one way or another.
He differs from the Cyrenaics regarding pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only active pleasure, while he accepts both, in the soul and in the body, as he says in On Choice and Avoidance, in On Ends, in the first book of On Lives, and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Diogenes, in the 17th book of his Selections, and Metrodorus, in his Timocrates, likewise say that pleasure can be conceived in both active and static forms. Epicurus, in his On Choices, says “Freedom from mental distress and freedom from bodily pain are both static pleasures, while joy and delight are considered to be active and involving motion.
Here we have the famous distinction between active (or “kinetic”) and static (or “katestematic”) pleasures. Although the concept is not explicitly elaborated in any of our longer surviving works by Epicurus himself, it points to a major point of differentiation between the Epicureans and the other prominent hedonist school, the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics are roughly what common prejudice thinks the Epicureans are: they advocate for collecting lots of positive physical pleasures, consider the absence of active pleasure to be a neutral rather than positive state, and advise focusing on the present. As I’ve discussed before, the Epicurean idea of pleasure is much different from this kind of clichéd hedonism: we place far more value on the “static” pleasure of being free from pain and distress than on maximizing the frequency of titillating experiences.
In this also he differs from the Cyrenaics: they hold that bodily suffering is worse than mental suffering, for wrongdoers are punished in their bodies. Epicurus, however, considers mental suffering to be worse, for the flesh feels its distress only in the present, while the soul’s suffering encompasses the past, present, and future. In the same way, he holds the pleasures of the soul to be greater than those of the body.
Additionally, Epicurus considers mental pleasure and pain to be more important than physical pleasure and pain. Here, this differentiation is attributed to temporal scale: mental distress can cause us pain in remembrance or anticipation, while an episode of physical pain is intrinsically limited to the present. (We can remember past physical pain, or worry about future physical pain, but those experiences are themselves mental.) Elsewhere, Epicurus often emphasizes how simple the actual needs of the body are: “not to be thirsty, not to be hungry, not to be cold” is all a healthy body needs to alleviate its pains. Freeing ourselves from mental disturbances like fear or unfulfillable desire is often the more complex process. Physical suffering is therefore both less severe for the typical person, and a less pressing philosophical problem on the population level (outside of times of terrible famine or the like).
As proof that pleasure is our goal, he observes that as soon as living creatures are born they take satisfaction in pleasure and avoid pain, naturally and without reasoning. We flee suffering, therefore, instinctively. It is in this way that Heracles shouts out as he is devoured by the shirt [of Nessus]:
With him weeping and crying out, the rocks were moaning, Locris’ mountain peaks and the heights of Euboea.
This is a fairly clear, though brief, statement of the Epicurean belief in psychological hedonism: we consider that all creatures necessarily seek pleasure and avoid pain. At a fundamental level, this isn’t a matter of choice. What does vary and cause differences in our choices are our ideas about what will bring us pleasure and pain. Epicurean philosophy is therefore largely occupied with evaluating what courses of action seem empirically more likely to secure our physical needs while avoiding unnecessary distress. This is the broadest possible conception of “pleasure,” one which drives some people crazy (Cicero, for instance), but which has had some prominent philosophical supporters (such as John Stuart Mill).
The quoted lines about Heracles (Hercules) come from Sophocles and don’t add much. (This is probably a Diogenes example, rather than an Epicurus example.) You can read a short summary of the story of the death of Heracles if you like; I guess the point in Diogenes Laertius’ mind is that not even the greatest heroes can choose not to feel pain when their body is smothered in Hydra blood. Which is true, though perhaps not the most relevant parallel for the average person.
Epicurus says that the virtues are chosen not for themselves, but for the sake of pleasure, just as we choose medicine for the sake of health. In the 20th book of the Selections, Diogenes says this too. He also says that education is something that continues throughout one’s life. And Epicurus says that only virtue is inseparable from pleasure, while other things, such as the food we eat, can be separated.
A practical application of psychological hedonism: How could it be that people choose the virtues “for the sake of” pleasure? To many, this seems obviously false. Doesn’t someone choose to be diligent, even though laziness would be more pleasant? Doesn’t someone choose to be honest, even though lying would bring advantages? According to the Epicureans, this is a biased, inaccurate, and unhelpful way of understanding our motivations. Instead, we always choose what seems to us like the most pleasurable path.
Sometimes, we may “act virtuously” while being well-aware that we are choosing our own advantage. Maybe a kid cleans his room not because of any sense that it is “the right thing to do,” but because he knows he will be punished if he does not—cleaning the room seems less painful. Sometimes, however, fundamentally similar social pressures may be less obvious. Maybe someone will choose to tell the truth not because they know for sure that a self-interested lie would be detected, but because of a vague and inchoate sense of unease that they feel when they consider lying. Many traditional moralists like to downplay this complex web of motivations at play within us; most individuals, when they do the “right” thing, like to claim that such self-interested, prudential speculation never crossed their mind, and that they acted out of a pure commitment to virtuous behavior. But how can we ever disentangle such entirely interior impulses? Even those who hesitate least, who spend the least time dwelling on possible downsides to misbehavior, are not necessarily the most “virtuous” in any noble sense. They may just be well-trained goody-two-shoes who have developed extreme levels of timidity about “breaking the rules.” Epicureans act as virtuously as anyone. We just don't get all stuck up about it.
All in all, the Epicurean take is pragmatic: don’t worry about dressing up some of your motivations as “good” and others as “bad.” Instead, just practice recognizing how going with the socially-approved flow of virtuous behavior is generally the least troublesome, least stressful way to behave. Doing something “wrong” is highly unlikely to get you anything truly necessary to your happiness, while it is essentially certain to degrade your peace of mind. “Virtue,” therefore, is “inseparable from pleasure.”
It is not entirely clear why food would be more separable, as the last line says—we really do need to eat!—but one idea is that this is referring to specific foods we eat. While we can cast aside burgers and fries without losing the static pleasure of sated hunger, we cannot abandon the virtues in the same way: that inevitably harms our tranquility.
Come now, then, and let us put the crown, as one might say, to this whole book and to this philosopher’s biography. By presenting his Principal Doctrines and with them closing the whole work, we shall use for our ending the beginning of happiness.
And that’s a wrap. From Diogenes Laertius, we’ve now covered the entirety of the Letter to Menoeceus and the Letter to Idomeneus, the Principal Doctrines are well underway, and the additional ethical material has all been translated and discussed. While a few passages from the scientific letters (to Herodotus and Pythocles, also included in Diogenes Laertius) may merit inclusion in our ethical discussions at some point, future translations will shift increasingly toward later writers. We’re not done with the master himself—various essentially verbatim maxims have come down through other sources—but other followers of the Epicurean tradition will also help to fill in the picture of how we can live well.
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Original Text
[135] Μαντικὴν δ᾽ ἅπασαν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀναιρεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ μικρᾷ ἐπιτομῇ. καί φησι: “μαντικὴ οὖσα ἀνύπαρκτος, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτή, οὐδὲν παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἡγῇ τὰ γινόμενα.” Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν βιωτικῶν: καὶ ἐπὶ πλείω διείλεκται ἀλλαχόθι.
[136] Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει: ὁ δὲ ἀμφότερα <τὰ γένη> ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φίλους ἐπιστολῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: “ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.”
[137] Ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκούς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας τῶν ψυχικῶν, κολάζεσθαι γοῦν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας σώματι: ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικάς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς.
ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τῷ τὰ ζῷα ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι τῇ μὲν εὐαρεστεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ πόνῳ προσκρούειν φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου. αὐτοπαθῶς οὖν φεύγομεν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα: ἵνα καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς καταβιβρωσκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ χιτῶνος βοᾷ
δακρύων ἰύζων: ἀμφὶ δ᾽ ἔστενον πέτραι Λοκρῶν τ᾽ ὄρειοι πρῶνες Εὐβοίας τ᾽ ἄκραι.
[138] Διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι᾽ αὑτάς, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ εἰκοστῇ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων, ὃς καὶ διαγωγὴν λέγει τὴν ἀγωγήν. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ἀχώριστόν φησι τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα χωρίζεσθαι, οἷον βρωτά.
Καὶ φέρε οὖν δὴ νῦν τὸν κολοφῶνα, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἐπιθῶμεν τοῦ παντὸς συγγράμματος καὶ τοῦ βίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τὰς Κυρίας αὐτοῦ δόξας παραθέμενοι καὶ ταύταις τὸ πᾶν σύγγραμμα κατακλείσαντες, τέλει χρησάμενοι τῇ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀρχῇ.
The Greek says that events are ouden par hemas. Epicurus more typically uses the famous phrase ouden pros hemas (“nothing to us,” in relation to death, for instance), but it is unclear how exactly this phrase differs. Some scholars emend par to pros and some attempt more acrobatic additions; some translate simply (“events are nothing to us”) and some with a heavier interpretative hand (“are nothing to the lives within us”—DeWitt). I don’t really know if there is anything meaningful going on with this atypical preposition use, but I think it is very likely that the basic meaning is something similar to what I argue above.
The point about divination is a characteristic that distinguishes Epicureanism from Stoicism. The Stoics considered divination to be a "science" - a sub-discipline of physics. https://www.academia.edu/42057141/The_Role_of_Divination_in_the_Stoic_System